According to the results of the discussion held on April 25, 2024, at the Kyiv Orthodox Theological Academy, participants of the round table "Theological Aspects of the Doctrine/Ideology of the 'Russian World'" formulated conclusions and practical recommendations.
Scientists note that "the current Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been going on for more than 10 years, has as its ideological basis the doctrine of the 'Russian world,' which dates back to the beginning of the 16th century and is essentially a modernized version of the 'Moscow - Third Rome' doctrine."
They refer to the recent meeting of the World Russian People's Council and the document adopted there, called the "Order." Its text "contains no mention of God and Christ, the Virgin Mary, the Church, saints, etc.," instead, it "appeals to abstract 'spiritual-moral perspective,' 'traditional values,' and such secular ideologemes as 'Russian civilizational identity,' 'collective West,' 'unity of the Russian space,' 'triunity of the Russian people,' and 'fight against globalism and the collective West,' etc."
The participants of the round table emphasize that this document "openly has an anti-Christian character, propagating xenophobia and violence for the sake of another social experiment, while simultaneously claiming a special messianic role for the Russian state, the Russian people, and the 'Russian world' as a 'restrainer' ('katechon') supposedly creating a 'special civilization' and 'Russian civilizational identity' in opposition to the 'fallen into Satanism West.' Today, the 'Russian world' is essentially a Eurasian political ideology of neo-imperial aggression and war using certain elements of Christian social doctrine."
Therefore, among other things, theologians and religious scholars call on Ukrainian parliamentarians "to give legal definition to the concept of the ideology of the 'Russian world' ('Russian world'), which poses a threat to the national security of Ukraine and has a harmful influence on the lives and health of its citizens, so that organizations and individuals propagating this ideology or its components bear responsibility according to Ukrainian legislation."
Here is the full text of the resolution:
Resolution of the round table "Theological Aspects of the Doctrine/Ideology of the 'Russian World'"
1. The current Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been going on for more than 10 years, has as its ideological basis the doctrine of the 'Russian world' ('Russian world'), which dates back to the beginning of the 16th century and is essentially a modernized version of the 'Moscow - Third Rome' doctrine.
2. To justify the claims of the Russian Federation to global domination, a quasi-religious doctrine was constructed, positioning Russia as the defender of Orthodox spirituality against 'Western values.' The Russian Orthodox Church actively participated in shaping the modern version of the hybrid ideology of the 'Russian world' at the end of the 20th century. Since the beginning of the 21st century, when Kirill Gundyaev, the founder of the World Russian People's Council, was elected Patriarch of Moscow, the ROC has essentially led this process.
3. The ideology of the 'Russian world' acquired a formalized and articulated form in the March 2024 'order' of the XXV World Russian People's Council, 'The Present and Future of the Russian World.' Based on this document, the 'Russian world' can be defined as an ideological Nazism. According to the logic of the 'order,' Ukraine cannot be an independent state, Ukrainians and Belarusians do not exist (they are parts of the Russian people), and Russia is a 'spiritual civilization' fighting against the 'world evil of the West.' Despite a strong emphasis on Russia's roots in Orthodox traditions, the text of the 'order' contains no mention of God and Christ, the Virgin Mary, the Church, saints, etc. Instead of these fundamental categories of the Christian faith, the document appeals to abstract 'spiritual-moral perspective,' 'traditional values,' and such secular ideologemes as 'Russian civilizational identity,' 'collective West,' 'unity of the Russian space,' 'triunity of the Russian people,' and 'fight against globalism and the collective West,' etc. Having an openly anti-Christian character, propagating xenophobia and violence for the sake of another social experiment, the document simultaneously claims a special messianic role for the Russian state, the Russian people, and the 'Russian world' as a 'restrainer' ('katechon') supposedly creating a 'special civilization' and 'Russian civilizational identity' in opposition to the 'fallen into Satanism West.' Today, the 'Russian world' is essentially a Eurasian political ideology of neo-imperial aggression and war using certain elements of Christian social doctrine.
4. The ideology of the 'Russian world' has a pronounced heretical character. The departure of Moscow Orthodoxy from Christian doctrine is clearly manifested in the promotion of the cult of violence and the justification ('forgiveness of sins') of the perpetrators of violence, the use of the Church as a means to achieve the political goal of Russia's secular leadership (locally – the seizure of Ukraine, globally – the destruction of the 'collective enemy,' i.e., Western civilization), incitement of apocalyptic moods among believers, readiness to destroy the world (nuclear blackmail) to achieve an imaginary victory, etc. Thus, there is a substitution of the doctrinal truths of Christianity and the teaching of the Church with historical and political myths aimed at the political sacralization of the state power of the Kremlin regime and its neo-imperial geopolitics.
Participants of the round table also note that the current version of the "Russian World" ideology has even exceeded the boundaries of ethno-phyletic heresy and is rapidly departing from Christian doctrine. By its content, this system tends towards dualistic religions such as Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, or various pre-Christian Gnostic movements, where the same "single evil principle" plays a leading role in its eternal struggle against good.
5. The creation by the Moscow Patriarchate of a new "theology of war" ("holy war") increasingly resembles the creation of a new "civil religion" with the cult of the "Moscow / Russian state" and the "holy (triune) Rus," where Christian values are consciously sidelined in favor of achieving the aggressive goals of the political leadership of the Russian Federation.
The basic ideas ("dogmas") of this new religion include the doctrine of a thousand-year existence ("from Vladimir to Vladimir"); the identification of the term "Rus" with "Russian statehood" ("Rus is Russia"); messianism and the cult of "holy Russia" as a "protector" ("katechon"); the cult of Victory and the myth of fascists (not real or historical, but invented to achieve one's own goals) as the embodiment of global evil; a Gnostic-Manichaean view of history as a radical binary confrontation between good and evil, where Russia is a "besieged fortress"; a model of history where Russia is the embodiment of the Absolute Spirit and where there are "real nations" ("great powers") and "invented nations"; the myth of Muscovy / Russia as the defender of oppressed peoples (Orthodox, Slavs, etc.) against oppressors (Catholics, non-Slavs, the West, etc.). Moreover, the unity of "holy Russia" is not a historical unity and cultural tradition of the Christian European civilization of Rus-Ukraine, not its connection and continuity with the Moscow Kingdom and the Russian Empire, but rather a historical-mythological reality and an artificial ideological construct of some mythical "Russian unity," "civilizational identity."
This new civil (political) religion uses the Orthodox context as one of the spheres of dissemination, use, and legitimation of its own rule.
6. Given this, the "Russian World" poses a threat not only to the entire Christian world but also to humanity as a whole. This has been repeatedly emphasized by prominent theologians from around the world (see: "Declaration on the Teaching of the 'Russian World' (Russkiy Mir)"). Attention has been drawn to the heresy of ethnophilism infecting the ROC by both the Hierarchal Council of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (May 24, 2022) and the Hierarchal Synod of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (February 14, 2024). The threat of the "Russian World" ideology has also been repeatedly mentioned by the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations ("Statement of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations regarding the condemnation of documents of the 'World Russian People's Council' containing justification of Russian aggression against Ukraine," March 29, 2024).
7. The task of today's Ukrainian intellectuals should be the deconstruction of the Russian grand narrative of the "Russian World" and the demonstration of its artificiality compared to the Ukrainian world, which cannot develop in opposition to the Russian narrative, as the Ukrainian grand narrative began to form when the Moscow state did not yet exist. If the Russian Federation ceases to exist in its current form, then nothing fundamental should change in our positive grand narrative (self-image, plans for the future, country-building strategy, etc.), in which Ukraine will continue to be a self-sufficient, free country, whose existence and goals do not depend on its enemies or competitors.
8. We appeal to the Hierarchal Council of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to provide a theological assessment of the ideology of the "Russian World" ("Russkiy Mir") not only as ethnophilistic heresy but also as a teaching that puts not only the leadership but also the entire ROC, which actively supports this ideology (or rather, "civil religion"), beyond the bounds of Orthodox Christianity.
9. We appeal to the leadership of the higher spiritual educational institutions of all Churches and religious organizations, as well as to other educational institutions operating in Ukraine, with a proposal to introduce into the curriculum separate components analyzing the ideology of the "Russian World" ("Russkiy Mir") and its destructive influence on the development of religious organizations or the country as a whole, as well as on each individual.
10. We appeal to Ukrainian parliamentarians with a call to give a legal definition to the concept of the "Russian World" ("Russkiy Mir"), which poses a threat to the national security of Ukraine and has a harmful effect on the life and health of its citizens, so that organizations and individuals propagating this ideology or its components bear responsibility according to Ukrainian legislation.