The 24th annual study by the Razumkov Center on the characteristics of religious life in Ukrainian society and its changes under the influence of war was presented at the Ukrinform news agency on January 28. The discussion also touched upon the recently adopted law regulating the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and the state’s information policy in this area — or, rather, its absence.
For almost a quarter of a century, the Razumkov Center’s sociological service has conducted comprehensive research on religious trends in Ukraine, interfaith relations, and church-state interactions. The study’s long-term partner is the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Representation in Ukraine.
It is dedicated to the religious situation in Ukraine, the relationship of churches with state institutions, interfaith relations, changes in citizens' awareness of the importance of the religious sphere, changes in the religious sphere under the influence of war, as well as citizens' perception of the need to protect national security in the spiritual sphere and the inadmissibility of the aggressor state’s influence on the religious and informational environment of a country at war.
Representatives of the Razumkov Center, the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, religious scholars, and members of parliament participated in the presentation. Representatives of embassies from various countries, public organizations, and Western analytical centers joined online.
The importance of the study was emphasized by Thomas Birringer, Head of the Representative Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ukraine, as it can clarify to foreign politicians and scholars why the recently adopted law “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Activities of Religious Organizations” is necessary and help address certain misunderstandings associated with it.
The Head of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, Viktor Yelensky, noted that over 24 years of these annual sociological studies, a vast documentary body has been created. In particular, the recorded changes in perceptions of religion in Ukraine, church-state relations, and legislative initiatives since 2000 have become particularly significant after 2014 and 2022.
The Deputy Director of the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Center, Mykhailo Mishchenko, provided an overview of the study and explained how it was conducted. For example, the survey was conducted only in territories controlled by the Ukrainian government. Since it was not possible to survey citizens abroad, the study relied on statistical data recorded before the full-scale war.
“We survey the same proportion of respondents in the eastern region as before the full-scale invasion,” said the sociologist. “We believe that the opinions of people currently residing in a certain region reflect the views of those who left to escape the war. After all, religious beliefs change slowly.”
As noted in the analytical study, the majority of respondents agreed that churches and various religious organizations should be involved in shaping the national idea, the model of post-war Ukraine, and the development of state policy strategy. Furthermore, they believe that the state should collaborate more with churches and religious organizations abroad to advocate for national interests.
The First Deputy Head of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, Viktor Voynalovych, expressed confidence that the maturity of Ukrainian society is reflected in its adequate perception of the potential of the religious space and churches. “Every year, we witness—and research confirms—that despite changing circumstances, trust in churches remains high,” Voynalovych emphasized. “Society entrusts churches with a mission in social service, humanitarian aid, and the activation of international efforts to protect Ukraine’s interests.”
Research by the Razumkov Center records an increase in those identifying as believers since the beginning of Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine in 2014. A new surge in religious sentiment occurred in 2022. Although indicators declined over time, as of today, 22% of respondents believe that since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, they have strengthened their faith and become more religious.
Interestingly, since 2014, the number of people identifying as Orthodox has steadily declined. In 2014, 70% considered themselves Orthodox; in 2024, this figure stands at 55%. The number of Greek Catholics has increased — from 8% to nearly 12%. The number of believers affiliated with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which in 2022 was 20%, is now 35%. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, there has been a significant decrease in those identifying with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. In 2021, this figure was 13%; today, it is 5.5%.
The study also revealed negative phenomena. For instance, 7% of respondents noted that they were aware of cases where religious communities, after the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, expressed support for Russia's actions. 4.5% knew of cases where religious communities assisted the occupiers. 4% witnessed humanitarian aid being appropriated in churches.
In addition, most believers testified that their religious community has provided assistance to the Ukrainian army, as well as material aid and shelter to refugees since the beginning of the full-scale war.
According to the head of the "Information Defense" project, the Open Policy Foundation, and former Minister of Youth and Sports, Ihor Zhdanov, it is difficult to remain a supporter of the Russian Church when those who are blessed by its leader to kill are pointing weapons at you. As an example, Ihor Zhdanov cited the "increase in awareness" of Metropolitan Agafangel of the UOC in Odesa, particularly after the destruction of the Cathedral of the Transfiguration in Odesa. "He is called an 'Orthodox communist' because he was a member of parliament in the Communist faction during the first convocation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine," explains the former minister. "After his church was destroyed by a Russian missile attack, Agafangel, though not radically, changed his attitude toward the 'Russian world'."
Sociological research has shown that Ukraine has no grounds for interreligious, interfaith, or interchurch conflicts, as only 2.5% of citizens primarily identify with people of the same faith or church. The vast majority of respondents primarily consider themselves Ukrainian citizens. Meanwhile, religious and church identity ranks nearly last. Probably for this reason, the majority — 74% of respondents—support the adoption of the law "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations," which prohibits in Ukraine the activity of a church with a governing center in the aggressor country. After all, people who primarily consider themselves Ukrainian citizens understand the national security threat posed by "saboteurs in cassocks."
"The public and political environment has faced the need to protect Ukraine from the aggressor’s attempts to use religion to undermine Ukrainian statehood, to destroy Ukraine through 'de-Ukrainization,'" emphasized the head of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, Viktor Yelensky. "After all, this goal was announced not only by the leadership of the Russian Federation but also by the Russian Orthodox Church. According to a resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, it is the ideological continuation of Putin's regime."
Viktor Yelensky recalled that the law "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order…" became the subject of serious political debates and public discussions, as well as mass disinformation operations by Russia.
"This law, signed by the President on August 24, 2024, prohibits the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and provides religious organizations affiliated with it the opportunity to leave," explained Viktor Yelensky. "The law meets the test applied to measure the democratic nature of laws in the sphere of freedom of conscience: it aims at a legitimate goal, achieves it in a democratic way, and does not impose a burden on believers' consciences, since belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate is not part of Orthodox doctrine. Ultimately, in each case, the issue of terminating the activities of a particular organization will be decided in court."
The head of the "Information Defense" project, the Open Policy Foundation, and former Minister of Youth and Sports, Ihor Zhdanov, emphasized: "The vast majority of Ukrainian society expects this law to be enforced. And if the UOC-MP does not comply with the law’s requirements, it will be banned as an entity with a governing center in a country that has launched armed aggression."
According to Viktor Yelensky, the regulatory acts for the law's implementation have already been developed, have passed interdepartmental coordination, and are expected to be approved by the government in the near future. Nine months after the law is signed, it will come into force. Research will be conducted to determine whether a particular community is part of the Russian Orthodox Church or not. If a community affiliated with the ROC does not comply with the order to sever ties with the banned Church, the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience will have the right to appeal to the court. "The UOC belongs to the Moscow Patriarchate, but it is registered in Ukraine under Ukrainian law," reminds the head of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience. "It is affiliated with the center in Moscow. If, during the court proceedings, the connection is not severed, the court must make a fair decision."
A scientific advisor to the Razumkov Center, political scientist Oleksiy Haran, posed a direct question: "Will each of the 7,000 UOC-MP communities require a separate court case? Won't this lead to the situation where, de facto, this organization, by disguising itself, will continue to exist for a long time?"
Moreover, the process of transitioning from the UOC-MP to the OCU has significantly slowed down.
"In many ways, this is related to a phenomenon I call 'pious waiting,' when representatives of the UOC-MP likely hope that during negotiations, the Russian side will demand the preservation or restoration of the UOC-MP's position in Ukraine," noted Ukrainian MP Rostyslav Pavlenko, known for his role in shaping state policy in the religious sphere and one of the ideologists of the law "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order..."
Rostyslav Pavlenko: "However, research data indicate that this will lead to the activation of a serious conflict. Much more work needs to be done in the information sphere, explanatory efforts must be conducted to ensure the law is correctly applied."
Explanatory work can significantly simplify and accelerate the outcomes of the law’s adoption. Political scientist and scientific advisor to the Razumkov Center Oleksiy Haran spoke about the specifics of such efforts. He is convinced that it is necessary to consider the fact that the aggressor, in its subversive activities, is using a certain, albeit small, number of people who consider themselves believers of the UOC-MP. "In my circle, there is a volunteer who does a lot for the front," said Oleksiy Haran. "But when you start discussing this topic with him, he becomes completely defensive. And we need to take this into account in our explanatory work."
According to Professor Oleksandr Sagan, head of the department at the Hryhorii Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, many citizens are disoriented because their priests have convinced them that they do not belong to the Moscow Patriarchate. "As a result, they do not identify themselves with the Russian Church and do not realize that their community is actually subordinate to Moscow," he explains. The Razumkov Center's sociological research recorded in 2024 that the UOC-MP has only 5.5% of adherents in Ukraine, but in reality, somewhat more citizens remain associated with this religious institution.
"The data presented in this study clearly show that the state is systematically failing in its information policy, particularly in explaining the situation to believers," says Oleksandr Sagan. "We have an entire ministry responsible for information policy, yet I cannot recall a single campaign—neither under the previous minister nor the current one—that was aimed at providing an explanation."
The head of the Department of Religious Studies notes that Ukraine has significant academic potential in religious studies, yet it is not being utilized for explanatory efforts. Moreover, there is no single state program that would facilitate public educational efforts and inform believers about the objective religious situation in Ukraine.
"Unfortunately, state authorities previously lacked a full understanding of what was happening in the religious sphere. Now, due to the war, we are gradually becoming more informed," said Vyacheslav Horshkov, Deputy Head of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience. "There is intensive communication taking place between different religious organizations and the state," he noted. "However, we still encounter misunderstandings from our foreign partners regarding the religious situation in Ukraine. But thanks to research and communication, we feel that we are gradually reaching those people who are focused on Ukraine."
Nevertheless, according to Vyacheslav Horshkov, foreign partners often still do not understand what the real religious situation in Ukraine is. However, thanks to research and improved communication, those who are focused on Ukraine are becoming more informed and drawing the right conclusions. Thus, on January 23, the European Parliament adopted a resolution "On Disinformation and Historical Falsifications by Russia to Justify Its Aggressive War Against Ukraine." Paragraph 12 of this resolution condemns Russia’s exploitation of the Orthodox religion for geopolitical purposes, particularly through the instrumentalization of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as a tool of influence over Orthodox populations in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other countries.
"Gradually, there is a growing understanding of what is happening in Ukraine," notes Vyacheslav Horshkov. "We are not waging war against religion; instead, we are striving to ensure that religion is not turned into a tool of hostile influence and that Christianity, with its high values, is not reduced to a criminal state ideology."
On January 29, this research was also presented in London, so that foreign politicians and public figures could receive information from primary sources rather than from Russian propagandists.
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