The year 2024 seems to have become one of the most turbulent ones for Ukrainian Orthodoxy over the past decade. UOC’s relations with general public and the government have reached an impasse, and amid international political uncertainty, under the pressure from the OCU and opposition politicians, the Law on Affiliation was adopted, with the ultimate goal of stripping UOC communities of their legal status.
Source: Religion in Ukraine
Against this background, there is a surge of interest from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in returning to its mediating role in the hope of resuming the process of unification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy under the auspices of the Tomos of Autocephaly granted in 2019. Inter-church wars have had a heavy toll on the efforts to consolidate the society, which is being tested by the challenging developments on the front lines. Although it seems that any dialogue initiatives are unpopular among the public, timid calls are gradually emerging to reduce inter-church aggression. As a response to this call, the Sofia Brotherhood was conceived – a unique platform for communication between the OCU, UOC, and Ecumenical Patriarchate. Although the Brotherhood has been out there for less than a year, it is already a recognizable “brand”.
The Religion in Ukraine outlet spoke with Ihor Kovrovsky, an UOC archpriest and member of the board at the Sofia Brotherhood, on the prospects of reconciliation of Ukrainian churches and negotiations between the UOC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the reasons behind the indecisiveness of Metropolitan Onufriy, prerequisites for dialogue between the UOC and OCU, peculiarities of interjurisdictional communication in the Sofia Brotherhood, reflection of public sentiments in public opinion polls, effectiveness of the Law on Affiliation, and much more.
I’d like to start off with the main thing. Today, relations between Ukrainian Orthodox churches are at their lowest. At the same time, everyone exploits the issue of unity. However, at the moment, it is a very abstract - and already discredited - word, behind which there’s nothing but hypocrisy. It’s become a figure of speech without real content to it. What’s unity for you? Is it a formalized goal, a state of mind, or preaching common values?
Perhaps, it’s all of the above.
If we talk about the structural unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, that is, the merging of all branches into a single church body, this should become the ultimate and formalized goal – and not only for the Sofia Brotherhood but for the entire Orthodox community in general. A long and rather difficult path leads to it.
When, during the creation of the Sofia Brotherhood, we were thinking about a right slogan that would express the essence and special purpose of our team, we focused on the words of Christ "that all of them may be one" (John 17:21), investing in it a far from formalized vision of unity issues. We are united when all the facets of social stratification are erased, especially jurisdictional ones. We are united when we fulfill Christ’s commandment of love, and not hypocritically. We are united when we jointly run missionary projects and initiatives. We are united when we work together to achieve peace or help those in need. We are united in understanding that the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is an indispensable condition for the unity of the people and a guarantee of the stability of our State. And much more.
And our unity starts with us seeing each other as brothers in Christ and trying to show it to everyone: there are no "PCU guys" or "UOC guys", there are Christians for whom the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is the objective of joint work. And it’s clear that the pinnacle of everything should be our unity around the single Eucharistic Chalice.
What do you see as the stages for achieving unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy – in a global sense, rather than the level of joint humanitarian efforts?
I guess we should remain optimistic realists. Apparently, we will not be invited to draw up a roadmap for developing a strategy for achieving the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. However, during our inter-church meetings in St. Sophia, we discussed such prospects and assessed how realistic they are. And taking into account the fact that the recognition of the Sofia Brotherhood as a kind of platform for interjurisdictional dialogue is expanding in church circles, we hope that the developments our community is working on will be useful for the course of possible negotiations. An example of such recognition can be the meeting of members of the Brotherhood with the delegation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This became possible, first of all, thanks to the positive assessment of our efforts by representatives of the patriarch. At that meeting, the question of the possibility of a visit by Sofia Brotherhood members to the Phanar was also raised.
Probably, the first significant step towards achieving unity should be the restoration of the UOC’s Eucharistic communication with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. I would like to remind you that the severance of relations, or rather the "suspension of Eucharistic communication" was not due to doctrinal issues, but "due to the intervention of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the domestoc affairs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church", as noted in the decision of the Synod. A sort of a good face in a bad game… At that time, no one even dared to say that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was not part of the Moscow Patriarchate, so a decision about "destructive activity and a gross violation of canonical rules" could only be made on the motion from Moscow. At the very least, it would be worthwhile to start off with revoking the decision to prohibit believers from participating in the Sacraments performed in the churches of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Speculation on the Eucharist is not appropriate whatsoever.
Next, inter-church negotiations with the participation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, setting up groups for dialogue, agreeing on controversial issues within the framework of that dialogue. And the first result of this process could be the mutual recognition of the Sacraments of both jurisdictions, which would allow believers to relieve tension in local relations. That is, there will be no more division into canonical and ‘non-canonical’, into dissidents and Moscowphiles, or other categories of irreconcilables.
The next stage may be the search for models of coexistence (hopefully interim ones) of different canonical jurisdictions in one canonical territory. In this matter, everyone must go for compromises regarding some of their ideals of the canonical structure of the Church, realizing both the temporary nature of the situation of "common dwelling" in a single Ukrainian house, and the irreversibility of structural unity set for the future. No one will deny that the period of such unification into a single structure can drag on for years, but the most important thing here is unity in Christ. In fact, understanding the existence of different models of coexistence of Orthodox jurisdictions is one of the fundamental principles of the efforts taken by the Sofia Brotherhood.
Of course, we are also aware that these issues should be resolved by leaders of the Churches. Ordinary believers, or even clerics, will have a rather indirect influence on the process. But working with community members, pointing out the ways of reconciliation and Christian love, educating and, if necessary, re-educating is a burden that everyone who wants to sincerely serve God must take on. Therefore, joint humanitarian action is also part of the work that will lead to the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
That is, the problem of unity should be solved from above? But bishops nod toward the congregation, the congregation – toward priests, and priests feel the bishops' moods. As a result, we see a paralysis of responsibility, and only those who are totally beyond this system – journalists, religious scholars, theologians, and public activists – can afford to express a point of view that is not necessarily in line with the mainstream stance.
Perhaps it is worth starting with the "mainstream line". Unfortunately, it is not defined by conciliarness, as many prefer to point out from high tribunes or pulpits. The principles of this line are determined by church conservatives in power regardless of their age and jurisdiction. The church as an organization is a rather conservative structure with a clear hierarchy that does not involve democracy or engaging church masses in decision-making. On the other hand, if necessary, the leadership can always nod toward the church public when it is unwilling want to take drastic steps. It is convenient to justify their reluctance or inaction with “people's moods and desires”.
As for the paralysis of responsibility, let me disagree. The manager is always responsible. Both for their action and for inaction. And if the Church (both as a structure and as a community) is destroyed, history will not ask the leader how many times a day he did a prayer service or knelt before the icons in his cell. It will ask how effective a "manager" he has been in keeping his flock from being scattered. The shepherd does not just walk along the herd: he knows where to go, where the best fields are, how to protect the herd from animals and evil people, and why he is doing all this. Therefore, I think everyone understands that the problem of unity must be solved "from above".
And perhaps people who are beyond the system are needed to stimulate the decision-making process. At the very least, to wake up the priesthood and the congregation, encourage them to actively express their opinions and positions on certain issues. That’s to make sure that bishops not nod toward their congregation, as you put it to "shift responsibility". So, for example, the Council of the UOC in Theophania already had a foundation shaped by numerous appeals to the Primate filed by communities and dioceses. However, we also have negative experience in this matter as other appeals and proposals coming "from below" are blatantly ignored.
I think that the Sofia Brotherhood accumulates in its ranks precisely such non-systemic people - those who have their own opinion, even if it doesn’t fit into mainstream; those who unite for the sake of a common goal – comprehensive promotion of inter-Orthodox dialogue to achieve unity.
What, in your opinion, are the deep, instrumental, and historical reasons behind the division of Ukrainian Orthodoxy?
I think that we shouldn’t dig deep into the historical roots of the division now. It is much more important to understand and understand the current situation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. How deep can we go into the past? To the autocephalous movement during World War 2? To the time prior to the creation of the Church headed by Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi? To the patriarchal and synodal charter of 1686?
The question is rather complicated, since a significant amount of subjective factors can be seen in it. That is, a lot depends on those who lead this process (or state) of division. I remember the frequency with which the issue of autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was raised and how all this was extinguished with a single remark resembling a bit that’s become a meme for Ukrainians: "It's not the right time!" And if a few years ago this could somehow be justified by the impossibility of Eucharistic communication between different Ukrainian Orthodox jurisdictions as a result of, say, the act of excommunication imposed on the head of the UOC (Kyiv Patriarchate) and thus the non-recognition of the validity of their ordinations, now the situation has gained ideological, rather than canonical, features.
It would seem that the decision by Constantinople of October 11, 2018, on the invalidity of the Moscow bans and the renewal of the hierarchy of the UOC (KP) and the UAOC in their episcopal or priestly ranks should have paved the path to understanding and unity. However, the UOC chose a different tactic (not a strategy, because strategists are based in the capital of Ukraine’s northeastern neighbor) - non-acceptance and non-recognition. And that is quite natural, actually, if you take into account the years and decades of preaching the gracelessness and perniciousness of the "Filaret schism". It turned out to be beyond our power to shift immediately to the perception of new realities, to embrace a Christian brother who "was dead and came to life, was lost and was found" (Lk. 15:32). The false prophecies of a host of elders about the special mission of Russian Orthodoxy and the impossibility of salvation beyond the Moscow patriarchal omophorion have taken root so deep in our minds that even a brutal war could not move these "postulates" from the heads of some of our reverends – and not only them.
The situation, however, is developing, and along with the canonical or ideological component of division, material and personal factors come to the fore. The newly proclaimed local Ukrainian Church, having received the Tomos of autocephaly, began to add to its ranks parishes from among the former communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Unfortunately, not all transitions are peaceful. There are known cases of forcible transition: either through the holding of parallel "meetings" of the parish, through a simple re-registration of the community, or even through the forceful seizure of a temple. There are different options, but none of them increases willingness of UOC clergymen to recognize their vis-a-vis as brothers in Christ.
Practically, we have found ourselves in a vicious circle: non-acceptance provokes aggression, which, in turn, fuels even more categorical non-acceptance. Who will break this vicious circle? People usually say that everything is in God's hands. But they also say that God has no hands other than ours...
Who makes decisions in the UOC? Everyone is used to the formula that the UOC is Metropolitan Onufriy, who makes (or does not make) decisions, and that he is responsible for everything. And everyone who knows him assures that between action and inaction he always chooses the latter. A fatalistic appoach. And therefore, any attempts to convince him that there is currently a critical situation that needs to be resolved, and not to hide in an internal hole, seem hopeless. This is what people who know Onufriy say. Is he really so indecisive - or pro-Russian - that it is easier for him to go into energy saving mode than to step out of his comfort zone and make some fateful decisions for his church?
I can’t offer a specific answer to this question, that is, to confirm that this particular person makes decisions while all the rest obediently fulfil them. That’s at least for the same objective reasons: I am not part of the governing bodies at the UOC. To express one's assumptions is to point one's finger at the sky. If we focus on statutory documents, it is the Primate and the Holy Synod as a collective body of Church leadership. Next come the Bishops' and Local Councils, which for some reason, contrary to the same Statute on the UOC management, have not been held for a long time. Apparently, there is no need to do so (?!).
In such a situation, the formula "you lead, so you bear responsibility" is quite natural. However, I am far from thinking that Metropolitan Onufriy single-handedly makes any decisions that are fateful for the Church. He does have a decisive word, but he hardly makes decisions alone.
I am not personally familiar with the metropolitan. I can draw conclusions only from the specific decisions he makes or those he doesn’t.
Why doesn’t he?
All of us would like decisions to be made on time and to meet today's requirements. But we assess this by the standards of our area of responsibility. In my opinion, such "indecisiveness" or "inaction" (I think, in terms of determining the future fate of the Church) is determined not so much by his pro-Russian stance or fatalism, but by concern that some drastic actions may lead to a new division on the religious map of Ukraine. I believe that the infamous decision made in Theophania to temporarily grant the heads of dioceses some special powers in managing their dioceses, which only the Synod and the Primate have, reflects part of these fears. We should also add silence regarding the outrageous annexation of a number of southern and eastern dioceses by the Moscow Patriarchate – a practical redrawing of diocesan borders, which even according to Moscow church rules is flagrant lawlessness. As for the "energy saving mode", according to your definition, it can probably be explained by the significant share of pro-Russian clerics, which at any opportunity can resort to demarche – threaten to go for direct subordination to Moscow and proceed under the supreme hand of the Moscow Patriarch. It is not for nothing that some of the UOC bishops openly prepare the flock for the “catacombs”. Therefore, it is likely that any fateful decisions in the mind of the Primate are associated with a church-wide disaster, which he cannot allow.
However, time will ultimately put each of us before a choice of conscience. Paraphrasing the words of one political figure of the 20th century: When you choose the latter between action and inaction, in the end you will lose everything.
How do you assess the prospect of the UOC reestablishing Eucharistic relations with local churches that have recognized the OCU, primarily with the Ecumenical Patriarchate?
According to the decision of the Holy Synod of November 13, 2018, the UOC suspended Eucharistic communication with the clergy of the Constantinople Patriarchate, and forbade its laity to participate in the Sacraments performed in the churches of the Constantinople Patriarchate. It's a rather awkward decision, made in line with a similar decision of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, which was made a little earlier. There was no other way, because the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was structurally part of it (it was before the Theophania Council and the cleansing of the Statute). Why awkward? It is forbidden to participate in the Sacraments in the churches of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. And if the priest of that Church serves in a temple, say, of the Romanian or Jerusalem Patriarchates? And why is the Ecumenical Patriarch not mentioned in the Diptych if the relevant decision was never made? And so on.
I’m convinced that the restoration of Eucharistic communication with the Ecumenical Patriarchate will be an important step towards the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. And the prerequisites to this end are already in place. Take, for example, the latest visit of the delegation from the Ecumenical Patriarchate to Kyiv, where its members had a number of meetings with both the country's leadership and heads of Orthodox churches. A few months ago, any contacts or meetings between the UOC and Constantinople were off the table as such. Now the situation is developing, becoming more flexible, which cannot but inspire cautious optimism. This, in particular, was discussed at the meeting of the delegation from the Ecumenical Patriarchate with representatives of the Sofia Brotherhood, hosted by the Mission “Stauropegium of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Ukraine" on August 28.
The restoration of such communication with the Ecumenical Patriarchate would certainly trigger a kind of chain reaction of restarting relations with Alexandria, Cyprus, and Athens, since these ecclesiastical-diplomatic misunderstandings have the same essence as the root cause.
I will add more. The restoration of relations would be a surprisingly effective solution to the issue of withdrawing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the scope of the recently adopted Law on Affiliation (Law of August 20, 2024 No. 3894-IX "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations" - ed.). In this way, it will be proven that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is not a structural part of the Russian Orthodox Church, since the latter is in a split with world Orthodoxy – and we are not!
How do you assess the prospect of the UOC recognizing Sacraments of the OCU?
Much depends on the prospects of the negotiation process with Constantinople. Provided that this will continue. Unfortunately, there are no other negotiating frameworks currently in sight. And the recent Address by Metropolitan Epifaniy to Metropolitan Onufriy with a call for a dialogue on unity has traditionally (sic!) remained ignored.
I will not try to come up with the reasons behind such idleness. I would only remind you that according to the definition drawn by the Council in Theophania, in order to start the negotiation process, the OCU shall first fulfill the three conditions: stop the forceful seizure of churches and the forcible transfer of parishes; accept that their canonical status of the OCU is non-autocephalous and significantly inferior to the status of the UOC; resolve the issue of the canonicality of the OCU hierarchy, i.e. restore the apostolic succession of bishops.
In my opinion, the very creation of groups or commissions from each side would already be a signal for the fulfillment of the first condition. And a moratorium on the transition of communities and the transition - or seizure - (in the opinion of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church) of churches could become the first joint decision based on the outcome of the meeting of such commissions. In any case, all these issues should not serve as an ultimatum (which is exactly how the OCU considers the said conditions), but a subject of discussion and joint resolution. In fact, the second requirement, in my opinion, is generally close to being absurd: what does it mean to "accept" and in what format should this acceptance take place? At the level of someone’s conscience or public remorse? And what practical benefit will such "acceptance" bring? That’s not clear to me.
I wish to hope that common sense and Christian love will prevail. Except for calls, I don't observe any movements, even on the part of those calling. Should I stay on the first step if I decided to climb to the top? Recently, in one of his numerous interviews, the spokesman for the OCU said that they are ready to sit down at the table today, tomorrow, or anytime, to have a frank talk. Therefore, take a step: form a commission and deploy them to Theophania. And let it not be just a PR campaign or a demonstration of the opposite party's inability to engage in dialogue. If you want unity, explore ways of achieving it. "Knock, and the door will be opened to you" (Matthew 7:7).
I’d like to ask you about the Sofia Brotherhood, which is a common project of three churches: the UOC, OCU, and Ecumenical Patriarchate. How challenging is it?
The Sophia Brotherhood went through a short, but rather stormy path to its formal structuring. It all started with an ad-hoc act by UOC clerics who voiced support for an open appeal to the Eastern Patriarchs regarding the condemnation of the actions of the Moscow Patriarch Kirill, who backed and blessed the bloody aggression of Putin's Russia against Ukraine. That voice of support became the impetus for the emergence of the "signatories" movement, which is somewhat chaotic and motley in terms of ideological and canonical preferences. And already in the midst of that movement, the ideas of unity started maturing "from below".
Meetings in St. Sophia of representatives of the UOC and OCU clergy allowed for not only discussing problems in relations between jurisdictions. From the very start, we were determined to find points of contact and paths leading to unity.
Were there any quitters?
Of course, some adjustments did take place: some withdrew from the process because they saw no sufficient level of actorship in our groups; some quit due to disagreement with the common position of participants, as they were determined to take more radical steps; and some saw no prospects or were simply preoccupied with other matters important for our common victory. And as early as then, we came to understand the need to create such an organization, which would have in its ranks representatives from various Churches, united by the common goal of promoting inter-Orthodox dialogue to achieve unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Thus, the backbone of the newly created organization consisted of individuals who had already gained some experience of communicating with each other, respected and, most importantly, shared each other's thoughts and ideas. This was even more evident when drawing the joint documents of the Brotherhood. Therefore, meo nomine, I’d say that it is not difficult to be among like-minded people, even from different Churches.
By the way, does the organization have its own "ethics code" that regulates the topic and tone of internal communications?
Each organization produces certain norms, if you like, its corporate code of conduct. And we have already considered the need to develop such an ethics code. A formal one. Although unofficially, it’s already there, it seems. This is our peculiar "Censum", which is determined by the main provisions of the Declaration of Understanding, adopted in July 2022 following the first meeting of priests from the UOC and OCU in St. Sophia, as well as by other joint documents.
In communities like the Sophia Brotherhood, there is a typical attitude - "we don't talk about confrontational stuff." That is, members stand for all good and against all bad. But, without discussing the pain points of your interlocutors, you can’t really hear them, understand their pain, and reflect on the circumstances that led to conflict. Do you have internal discussions and search for points of understanding?
To be honest, I am not aware of any communities similar to the Sophia Brotherhood. And neither am I aware of any such attitudes. Our community crystallized precisely on controversial grounds: having different approaches and a different vision of the developments, we have been trying to find commonality in this diversity. By no means do we avoid pain points. And substantive disputes sometimes emerge during their discussion. Moreover, they are needed to fully expose the problem and address the issue with maximum efficiency and taking everyone's position into account.
For example, the Brotherhood periodically releases appeals or statements regarding high-profile events taking place in our society or the Church. Each member of the board has the opportunity to express their vision of the problem and out forward specific proposals that will be taken into account in the jointly agreed text of the document. The discussion of such a document is usually quite a quick process, decisions on the final draft are made by consensus, which allows us to release it on time.
Also, if necessary, the board addresses the entirety of the Brotherhood in order to hear the attitude to a certain problem of as many of its members as possible. And there, trust me, discussions can turn into real verbal battles. And here the main thing is to shift away from some narrow corporate interests. I hope we succeed in this.
Does membership in the Brotherhood impose any restrictions on public expression of a point of view that other members may not like?
Membership in the Brotherhood is not like some blinders that limit freedom of thought and expression. Everyone has the right to publicize and defend their position – as long as it does not concern the official position of the Brotherhood. That is, if I express only my opinion, I should not rely on the authority of the organization or declare my belonging so that the public does not perceive my reasoning as a shared opinion, supported at least by the board of the Brotherhood. Whenever I position myself as a member of the Sofia Brotherhood, my public speeches, interviews, and so on must be in line with the principles of the organization I represent.
Certain individuals are entitled to speak officially, delivering agreed talking points on behalf of the organization. We didn't come up with this, it's common practice.
In general, when someone decides to join the Brotherhood, they, I hope, are aware of the obligations that membership imposes on them. They should be aware of the tasks that stand before us and the responsibility that they take upon themselves, including regarding their public behavior.
What are the Brotherhood’s areas of operations? Theological, research, humanitarian, educational (including church education)…
The Sofia Brotherhood is a young organization. We are yet to mark our first anniversary. So we are just building up our “cadre muscles”. And the directions of our work are laid down in our Charter. This is, first of all, about promoting the revival of the principle of concord in the life of the Church; facilitating dialogue between representatives of Orthodox Churches for the restoration of church unity in Ukraine; promoting Christian education through setting up and running Orthodox missionary projects; forming our own information field, producing publishing, online, and film projects, etc. That’s it, in short. And it is clear that each area of our work needs a certain staffing and material support. So far, we cannot fully cover all areas of statutory activity. However, some projects have already been launched, others have been announced and are awaiting implementation. In the end, thanks to the practically formed communication department (that's what we'll tentatively refer to it), our every step or event is seen on the Brotherhood website.
What activities are already part of your "portfolio"?
One of the latest events held by the Sofia Brotherhood nonprofit together with the Leontovych All-Ukrainian Choral Society was the regent's practicum "Melodic Transmission of the Church. Kyiv Church Song Tradition", held on September 19 in at in the conference hall of the Ukraina hotel.
This summer, with the support of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (Switzerland), the Brotherhood set up a children's and youth Orthodox camp, "Camp Unity" in the town of Truskavets.
In May, Lutsk hosted the seminar entitled “Liturgical Languages of the Kyivan Tradition: the Ukrainian Language and Kyivan Transliteration. Condition, prospects, problems", set up by the Sofia Brotherhood and the St. Lucaris Center nonprofit.
And besides that, we held a number of meetings, participated in various conferences and symposiums. A number of publishing projects are ahead.
Well, one particular significant event should be mentioned – the meeting of the Sophia Brotherhood with the delegation from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, where we had the opportunity to share our pain, highlight problems and hopes.
I would like to note once again that every step we take is open and public, which can be seen on the organization's website.
It looks legit. By the way, a "technical" question: what keeps Brotherhood priests from co-services? Is that about canonical discipline?
Let's talk about what we consider cooperation. If we are talking about the form of participation in the implementation of the sacraments of the Church, first of all, joint participation in liturgies, here the answer can be only one: yes, we refrain from that so far due to certain canonical reservations. We are clergymen with the UOC. Let me remind you that formally, the UOC is not in eucharistic communication with the OCU (and with a number of local Churches, to our great regret), so our participation in a joint liturgy may serve as a pretext for canonical bans imposed by the heads of the dioceses to which we belong. Thus, our abstinence is for the purpose of not giving an excuse “to those who are looking for an excuse...” (2 Cor. 11:12), and not at all because of the recognition or non-recognition of the validity of ordinations. I think that there are no such disciplinary nuances on the part of OCU priests.
If we are talking about a joint prayer, say, for Ukraine, its Armed Forces, peace for our people, etc., then what can become an obstacle for such a thing?
How does the episcopate of churches treat your community? Is there pressure, discontent, suspicions? Or, perhaps, on the contrary, are there blessings and informal support?
A wise man once said, "My greatest help is that I am not a hindrance." This is how I would like to describe the attitude of the episcopate in general.
Personally, I am not aware of cases where any of the clerics who are members of the Brotherhood have been persecuted or perhaps pressured to stop such activities. A single incident took place immediately after the founding meeting of the Brotherhood: the bishop was supposed to summon several priests either for a reprimand or for a “friendly conversation”... However, after we gained publicity and precautionary measures were taken regarding possible pressure, this stuff got watered down and never went beyond some usual “parental instructions”. Well, maybe Vladyka himself wanted to become a member of our organization? Just kidding, of course.
As for the suspicions or discontent, this is a personal judgment of certain bishops, which he, at least until now, has not yet made public. The same applies to the blessing. In general, one gets the impression (and to some extent not without reason) that they are studying us, trying to understand who we really are, what we are all about, and what to expect from us. At the same time, we’ve already gained wide publicity.
However, the negative side of being public often manifests itself in the fact that you begin to be attributed some weird features or associated without reason with one of the sides of the religious barricades. So even the Sofia Brotherhood was subjected to such attention from certain media outlets feeding off of monetary injections from well-known religious figures. They claimed we played almost a leading role in dirty games on the interjurisdictional chessboard. We immediately seek to reassure these people with simple words - stop talking nonsense! We are an open organization that consciously and sincerely adheres to the declared goal and principles of work.
But we do enjoy informal support from individual bishops. It is gratifying to realize that our views and aspirations are shared not only by believers and clergy, but also by representatives of the episcopate of all three jurisdictions represented in the Brotherhood. I am far from convinced that such support is continuous and will eventually grow into a kind of mainstream, but it inspires hope that the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, as a common goal, is not ephemeral.
What is your sense of the social and political situation? Does the society "thirst for blood" or has it grown wary of the inter-church war? Will we have to explain to people that religious war is not normal?
The situation when the "lust for blood" prevails in the consciousness of an average socially active Ukrainian citizen periodically arises when it is fueled by yet another “shot” of information of a certain, special kind. As is traditionally done in our country: someone takes some single case, wrap it in a package of systematicity, decorate it with boogeyman stories from the flight of their own imagination and serve it on a tray of outrage to be consumed by general public. Yes, even the words of the head of one of the government bodies, who claims that society is now asking for the UOC to be destroyed, adds fuel to the fire of inter-church strife. Or take an interview bby a highly respected bishop of the Church, who cannot (or does not want to) even call a war a war, and its ideological inspirer – a criminal. Who could remain indifferent here?
It is worth noting that there will always be groups of "irreconcilables" on both sides who will not listen either to each other, or to the voice of the Church, or to the voice of their own reason. For them, Christ and the Gospel are left far behind.
Still, I think peace is important for most people. Therefore, the Sofia Brotherhood sees its activities in this direction as one of the priorities. Our joint efforts should show people that there is a way without malice and hatred, without searching for culprits and criminals in cassocks, without mutual resentment.
How would you comment on the poll results that the majority of Ukrainians would like the UOC to be completely destroyed? And is it worth focusing on surveys in such complex issues? After all, this opens a Pandora's box. However, even the decisions of national or regional referendums were not always implemented in our country. For example, the outcome of the second referendum in 1994 was favorable to Kuchma, but was not implemented. The Zakarpattia referendum of 1991 did not lead to the full autonomy of the region.
In fact, by mentioning a Pandora's box, you have already answered this question. After all, sociological surveys are not a referendum, whose results must be implemented. Perhaps, under normal conditions, they could encourage the development of some effective programs or strategies.
In my opinion, to conduct polls, and even more so to focus on them in such extreme conditions, when society is practically fighting for its very existence, when tensions and emotions are at a peak, when calls are heard from everywhere to find and destroy the enemy within, definitely pointing in the direction of the UOC is not only inappropriate, but also unacceptable. People are driven by emotions, not common sense at all. And the results of such polls are partly influenced by constant mentions of "Moscow priests", candles bought in Moscow churches as bullets against our defenders, and so on. Any even casual negativity noticed in the UOC environment is presented as the main characteristic of the religious organization and is transformed in people's minds into the leading idea of its activity: the fifth column, which must be destroyed, and all adherents – forced out of Ukraine and into Russia.
Now we have, for example, the results of a survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, according to which 63% of respondents believe that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church should be completely banned in Ukraine. And according to only 12% of respondents, only individual possible cases of offenses committed by members of the UOC should be investigated. Note that only 12% hold the opinion that the accountability should be personified, while a critical share is convinced that the accountability should be borne by the entire Church. There is probably only one thing left: following the example of the high leadership of the Soviet times, make drastic decisions because "there is such a public opinion"! (I'm being sarcastic, of course.)
On the other hand, a significant share of responsibility for society's attitude towards the Ukrainian Orthodox Church lies with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church itself. Too often people see openly provocative behavior on the part of the most odious bishops or priests. And banal silencing of the crisis, avoiding concrete answers to the appeals from both society and one's own flock do not add to the authority of the Church at all. And here we are not talking about songs about “the bells ringing over Russia”…
It is difficult, almost impossible to understand the UOC bishops who destroy (deliberately and purposefully) the Church with their loud statements, defiant behavior, unequivocal accusations, and various accusations towards another religious organization. In this case, is the conclusion of a large part of Ukrainian society about the secret puppeteers who control the episcopate and the organization in general not legitimate? As one classic author once wrote: "Who’s paying for the party?" What results of surveys can we count on in this case?
I have a slightly "women-oriented" question. There is a feeling that there is too much "testosterone" in the church today (globally, regardless of jurisdiction). Hormone of aggression. Temples became points of confrontation, not unity in Christ. And women, who make up the vast majority of believers, begin to feel very uncomfortable and unprotected. None of them wants to come to the church on Sunday for Holy Communion, and instead become a witness or even a participant in a fight or conflict. Instead, male priests are the most active in such confrontations. Male bishops are also interested in this. Do you see this as a threat?
The points of confrontation that you are talking about arise as a result of the process of changing the jurisdiction of the community. More precisely, as a result of the forced transition of the community to another religious organization.
I would like to point out that there are practically no such confrontations, or they are nullified when the transition is truly voluntary: when with or without the priest, the community expresses its opinion and exercises its legal right.
Confrontations arise where the true opinion of the community is replaced by a staged show by visiting "artists". And not infrequently, for such "members of the community", the most powerful argument is a loud mouth and a strong fist. From time to time, we witness when such a change of the owner of the temple premises takes place through violence. I would like to emphasize that it is the change of the owner of the premises, not the jurisdiction of the community. Whether we realize it or not, the real struggle is going on outside the walls of the temple. And in this struggle, no one cares about people, about those Christians who indeed are the true Church. Some kind of distorted understanding takes root among ordinary people (or is it rooted in them) that, having taken away, for example, a temple building from the UOC community, in some inexplicable and strange way, the right spirit of the right religious organization will immediately come there, and numerous parishioners will naturally gravitate to the building - not me, maybe someone else, we don’t know who, but there will be many of them. But where do you find them? After the events I described, a new priest receives the keys to a room where there’s no one else. In that room, however, hatred, malice, and discord have been sown.
And I completely agree with your opinion that women, who make up the majority of believers in any community, become involuntary hostages of the situation. Especially when the case with the legalization of the transition or transfer (call it whatever you want) has already been settled, each of their visits to the temple borders on the risk of becoming participants in conflict. So what kind of peace of mind can you talk about when you are not allowed to enter the temple or are forcibly forced to leave it?
However, the biggest problem is that believers, observing our fighting, quietly "vote with their feet." And if it is not so noticeable in big cities, the same cannot be said about smaller settlements. Who will need those temple walls then?
Yes, everyone will lose. By the way, going back to transitions... Many see the achievement of unity in the absorption by one "patriotic" organization of elements of another, a priori "unpatriotic" one. But could it be the case that after the adoption of the Law on Affiliation, people will be moving from the UOC to the OCU for opportunistic reasons? And those who were called enemy aides and traitors yesterday, after joining the OCU, automatically become “the right kind of people” and “conscious patriots”. Would this be normal?
No, it wouldn’t be normal. Although I am far from the opinion that the adopted Law, or rather the process that will begin after the allotted nine-month period expires, will provoke a sharp jump in the transition of clergymen from the UOC to OCU. If such transitions will take place, then, I think, the impetus for this will be complete disappointment in the inaction of the Church leadership and its reluctance to take at least some steps towards unity. Not opportunistic motives at all. Those who wanted to take advantage of the moment already had enough time and opportunities to do so.
However, I understand that it is not about transitions themselves, but about the attitude towards those who transition. And for this you do not need to wait long: such cases have been observed before and can be observed now. I often wonder how genuine the relationship between the clergy of the OCU is with their new members from the "former" cohort. Precisely in view of the drastic change in rhetoric: from "thieves, collaborators and traitors" to "those consciously following the Tomos". I wish to believe that the spirit of sincere unity in Christ will prevail in their relationship. And I also believe that there is not such a strikingly significant number of such priests or believers with the OCU who would so hypocritically change their attitude depending on the situation.
In order to avoid this kind of cognitive dissonance, it is necessary, even when on different ecclesiastical and jurisdictional flanks, to remain a Christian, to see each other as a neighbor, not a foe. After all, the very understanding of the need to abandon aggression, stereotypes, prejudice, and the language of ultimatums and enmity in communication with each other and in public space is one of the main theses that determine the principles of activity of the Sofia Brotherhood, of which I am member.
In your opinion, will the Law on Affiliation put an end to the problem of influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on Ukraine?
I'm probably not the only one who got the impression that the issue of legislative regulation of the situation with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church periodically swells to a certain critical limit, a kind of boiling point. At this time, incriminating articles are intensively published, various surveys are conducted. And all with one goal – to expose the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as outsiders, even openly hostile formations in the body of Ukrainian society. For example, the Law you mentioned does not contain the slightest mention of the UOC. However, it may be mass media, or some vested interests, who "baptized" it with the title of the law “banning the UOC”. And this is exactly how Ukrainian civil society perceives it. But why only civil? Ecclesiastical too, regardless of jurisdiction. It is probably easier to pick up and repeat other people's ideas than to bother and actually read the Law.
When a certain task is fulfilled, a certain stage is overcome, the curve of interest in the Moscow church sharply goes down, only to stir the public again after some time with another portion of carefully prepared "accusations and exposures".
As for the question of the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Law will not solve it in any way. What might the impact be? Administrative? Only a complete ignoramus can claim that the Russian Orthodox Church has such levers of influence left. To destroy them, no law is needed: they were destroyed when the war was unleashed.
The situation is much worse with spiritual influence. The long stay of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the fairway of the ideology of the "Russian World" managed to cultivate in a certain part of the faithful the narratives of "unity, indivisibility, and no chances for salvation without the Moscow Patriarchate". Can any law knock this dust out of people’s minds? I doubt it. This requires delicate work, not swinging a saber.
What the Law can do and will certainly do is deprive UOC parishes of their churches, and cancel the registration of UOC communities. And here the most terrible thing is not the Law itself, but the greed of its executors. After all, no one will analyze how patriotic/unpatriotic the community or its leader is. The main thing is to "observe" the letter of the Law and report to the top offices about the "successful" fight against Moscow's center of influence on the ground. And what happens next? With a sense of a well-fulfilled duty, lawmakers will go to commissions, activists – back home. Churches, in the absence of parishioners, will turn into dust and overgrow with weeds, and the people who once prayed in these churches will remain with their troubles and grievances. A significant part of patriotic Ukrainians will find themselves overboard, branded as traitors and enemy aides. Also, another question is whether they will want to join in prayer with those who kicked them out of their temple.
However, that's not all. After all, the legislation allows the activity of religious organizations to continue even without registration. What will prevent such communities from resuming their activities on private territory without notifying the authorities? You can call such a community any way you like: it does not change the essence. How would you trace their affiliation with the Moscow Patriarchate? It is not so difficult to foresee the situation: Russian World adherents will remain Russian World adherents in a semi-legal state, a network of underground sectarian communities will begin to be created, whose activities the government will not be able to control. And the question of what will pose a greater threat to the interests of the state remains open. Let's resort to an analogy: it's like covering a wound with a band-aid without really treating it.
In essence, the Law cannot provide an answer to the question of leveling the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on Ukraine. Because the Church is not about walls, not about a priest and not even about a metropolitan. The Church is about people who are, in their majority, sincere patriots of Ukraine and on whom Moscow has no influence.
I would sincerely be happy if the Law could separate the grain of faith from the chaff of Moscow ideology. However...
Let's see how everything works out and whether the authors of the Law achieve their goal.
Thank you very much for this talk!