The Austrian Metropolis of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, under the leadership of Metropolitan Arsenios (Kardamakis), has recently established a new episcopal district that brings together Ukrainian Orthodox parishes in Austria and Hungary. Bishop Maksym (Rudko) has been appointed to lead this new district.
We spoke with Bishop Maksym about this new structure, the broader life of Ukrainian Orthodox believers in Austria and Hungary, local attitudes toward the war in Ukraine, and the extent of Russian influence and propaganda in the region.
By the way, Bishop Maksym (secular name: Roman Rudko) was born in Lviv, where he completed his studies at the theological seminary. He later pursued theology at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, earning a master’s degree there.
He was tonsured a monk and ordained a deacon in 2018 by Metropolitan Arsenios (Kardamakis), Metropolitan of Austria and Exarch of Hungary, at the Holy Trinity Cathedral in Vienna. In 2023, Metropolitan Arsenios ordained him a presbyter. That same year, Fr. Maksym was elevated to the rank of archimandrite and appointed protosyncellus of the Austrian Metropolis and Hungarian Exarchate.
On August 29, 2024, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate nominated him as vicar bishop of the Austrian Metropolis with the title Bishop of Aristea. His episcopal consecration took place in Vienna on November 10.
— Your Grace, let’s start from the beginning. How did a seminarian from Lviv end up studying in Greece and later find himself in Austria’s capital, where he became a monk, an archimandrite, and now a bishop?
— Glory to Jesus Christ! I sincerely thank the RISU news outlet for the opportunity to give this interview and share my thoughts. It is a great honor for me. May the Lord bless you in your work!
When I was in my final year at the Lviv Theological Seminary of the UAOC, we were visited by Archbishop Vsevolod (Maidansky), Archbishop of Skopelos of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA, and Bishop Ilarion, now Archbishop of Winnipeg and Metropolitan of the UOC of Canada (who at the time was still Bishop of Telmissos). They were selecting students to study in Greece. As it happened, I was among those chosen.
With the blessing of Metropolitan Makariy (Maletych) of Lviv, I went to study in Greece.
In Greece, I enrolled in the Faculty of Theology at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, in the pastoral department. I studied the Greek language, completed four years of undergraduate studies, another four years of graduate studies, and also entered the doctoral program.
In 2016, through Fr. Yurii Struhov—the first Ukrainian Orthodox priest in Austria, originally from Odesa—I was introduced to Metropolitan Arsenios of Austria. At the time, Metropolitan Arsenios was looking for a deacon and offered me that ministry. I agreed, and a year later, in December 2017, I moved to Austria.
In 2018, I was tonsured a monk, and on the Sunday of Orthodoxy, I was ordained a deacon at the Holy Trinity Cathedral in Vienna.
On November 10, 2023, on the feast of St. Arsenios of Cappadocia, I was ordained a priest, elevated to the rank of archimandrite, and appointed protosyncellus of the Austrian Metropolis and the Exarchate of Hungary.
Later, Metropolitan Arsenios approached me with a proposal: would I be willing to accept episcopal ministry? Of course, this was completely unexpected for me, and without doubt, it is a great responsibility before the Lord, the Mother Church, Metropolitan Arsenios, and the Ukrainian faithful. But recalling Christ’s words, “No one who puts a hand to the plow and looks back is fit for the kingdom of God,” I agreed.
And so, with the blessing of His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, I was elected Bishop of Aristea on August 29, 2024, during a session of the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
My episcopal consecration took place on November 10 of the same year at the Holy Trinity Cathedral in Vienna.
— Your Grace, could you tell us more about how this district was formed, whose initiative it was, and how many communities it currently includes?
— With the blessing of His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, who, as we know, sincerely cares for Ukraine (the granting of the Tomos is proof of that)—and at the initiative of Metropolitan Arsenios of Austria, the Episcopal District was created. It was established immediately after my episcopal consecration on November 10, 2024.
Metropolitan Arsenios recognized the growing presence of Ukrainians in Austria and Hungary and, having great love for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, considered it vitally important that they have a Ukrainian bishop—a bishop who could speak to them in their native language and offer them spiritual care.
Today, our district includes seven parishes: six located in various cities in Austria, and one in Budapest, Hungary. The clergy of our Episcopal District currently consists of ten priests.
— So, in essence, this is a vicariate within a diocese of the Ecumenical Patriarchate?
— Yes, it is essentially a vicariate within the Austrian Metropolis of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. However, in the Greek tradition, the term "vicariate" is not typically used; instead, the terms “episcopal district” or “episcopal periphery” (ἀρχιερατική περιφέρεια) are employed.
— Interestingly, in other European countries, Ukrainian Orthodox faithful often face difficulties in establishing such vicariates or even separate parishes. In some places, they are encouraged to join existing, mainly Greek, parishes; in others, they are allowed to celebrate separate Liturgies in Ukrainian; and in some cases, they function as missionary centers.
— Of course, we must understand that according to the Tomos granted by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, all Ukrainian parishes and clergy outside Ukraine—in the diaspora—fall under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, namely its metropolises in various countries.
Thus, the organization of Ukrainian parishes within those metropolises depends on each local metropolitan.
Ideally, every metropolis should welcome Ukrainian clergy because there are many Ukrainians across Europe. However, this decision rests with each local hierarch.
In our case, Metropolitan Arsenios was genuinely concerned about the fate of the Ukrainian Church and the Ukrainian people, so he chose to grant them the opportunity to serve in the Ukrainian language and according to Ukrainian traditions within his diocese.
Having known Metropolitan Arsenios for many years, I can confidently say that for him, the most important thing is the salvation of the human soul, for a person to live with Christ and His Church. He deeply understands that the Ecumenical Patriarchate is a home for all nationalities. As the Apostle Paul says: “There is neither Greek nor Jew, but Christ is all, and in all.”
We hope this initiative becomes a model for other metropolises of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
— Are there also communities of the UOC-MP (Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) in Austria? They surely exist in Hungary.
— Yes, of course. In Austria, there are four priests affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, and another one is in Budapest, Hungary. They all serve either in Serbian Orthodox churches or in Protestant communities' buildings. At the moment, their number is small, but there is a noticeable trend toward growth.
— How was your mission received in Hungary: by the local authorities, the Moscow Patriarchate, and other parties?
— It’s important to note that the Hungarian government actively supports Christian values and financially assists various Christian initiatives.
As for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Metropolitan Arsenios has built very good relations with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and maintains friendly ties with many Hungarian officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén.
The Hungarian government transferred ownership of a large building in the center of Budapest—12,000 square meters—to the Hungarian Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and is funding its restoration. A spiritual center for all Christians is planned in this building. The project also includes a church, which has already been decorated with beautiful frescoes in the Byzantine style. The building will serve the needs of the Greek, Hungarian, and Ukrainian communities.
As for the Russian Orthodox Church, our relations remain tense, since the majestic Church of the Dormition of the Most Holy Mother of God in Budapest, originally built by the Greek community, was taken over by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1949.
However, we have established good relations with other churches.
— Is there any dialogue or even basic communication with the UOC-MP clergy? Whom do they associate with? What is the mood in their circles? Have Russian information operations (IPSOs) infiltrated there?
— They don’t engage in dialogue or communication, except with the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church. The priest in Vienna affiliated with the UOC-MP concelebrated with a bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church here in Vienna. Their general attitude can be described as one of waiting and watching.
— Waiting for what? Does this priest identify in any way with the Ukrainian community or the embassy?
— When I speak of “waiting,” my personal opinion is that perhaps they are hoping for a change of government in Ukraine, and with it, a shift in how they are treated. This priest does not participate in events organized by the Ukrainian Embassy. As for the Ukrainian community, their outreach is directed only toward individuals who support the UOC-MP. There are no contacts with our clergy.
— It is known that in Austria—and even more so in Hungary—pro-Russian sentiment is widespread. The Russian community in Austria is known to interfere with Ukrainian activities, including parish fundraisers for the Armed Forces. Have you or your parishioners encountered any acts of aggression from Russians or their sympathizers?
— It should be noted that so far, there have been no incidents or acts of aggression from the Russian community toward our church or our parishes. We have not received any information, nor have we personally encountered direct manifestations of Russian propaganda.
— The media increasingly reports on Russian propaganda activities carried out through UOC-MP networks in Europe, including so-called “spy priests.” Have you encountered anything like this or received information about it?
— So far, we have not encountered such direct manifestations of Russian propaganda, nor received specific information on it.
— Are there ways to counter Russian propaganda, particularly through the Moscow Patriarchate’s networks?
— The mission of our Church—the Ecumenical Patriarchate—and of the Episcopal District in Austria and Hungary is to help Ukrainians find a home in God, to unite with Christ, to live with Him, and to save their souls.
All kinds of propaganda can be understood in light of the words of Gamaliel in the Acts of the Apostles, where he says: “If it is not from God, it will fail and disappear on its own” (Acts 5:38–39).
— How is your cooperation with the Ukrainian Embassy going? Are there joint initiatives?
— We actively cooperate with the Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Austria in cultural and educational projects. We participate in joint events, including commemorations of the Holodomor victims.
Together with our parish in Vienna and with the support of the Embassy, we organized a Holodomor exhibition in November 2022. In April 2024, we held an exhibition together titled “Cathedral of Our Souls”, where we told Europeans about churches destroyed during the war. We also jointly commemorate Ukrainian national holidays.
— In other countries where cooperation with the hierarchy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not been established, Ukrainian communities under their protection are few or non-existent, while UOC-MP or ROC communities remain active. Ukrainians sometimes join those churches, especially those who were MP parishioners back in Ukraine. What can be done about this? Are there any ways to influence Greek hierarchs in those countries, perhaps through the Phanar?
— Unfortunately, many Ukrainians do not understand the difference. Moreover, priests of the Moscow Patriarchate often present themselves as Ukrainian patriots.
As for other hierarchs of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, both the Patriarch himself and our Metropolitan Arsenios—who frequently travels to the Phanar and participates in Holy Synod sessions—emphasize to metropolitans the importance of supporting Ukrainians and welcoming them into their dioceses.
Many metropolitans in different countries do accept Ukrainians and allow them to serve within their dioceses. We hope that Metropolitan Arsenios’ initiative will be adopted by other hierarchs of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as well.
— By the way, have you encountered pro-Russian views even among clergy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Europe, particularly those who studied at ROC or UOC-MP seminaries? Some of them have been known to spread "talking points" portraying the Ukrainian government as “Nazi” or the UOC-MP as “persecuted.” Have you encountered such cases?
— We often receive visits from priests and bishops of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Vienna. All of them hold pro-Ukrainian views, care about Ukraine, and pray for the end of the war. Many bishops of the Ecumenical Patriarchate have Ukrainian priests serving in their communities.
— Ukrainians? From the diaspora or recent arrivals from Ukraine? And if they came from the UOC-MP, how can one be sure they won’t continue spreading the worldview shaped by MP propaganda? For example, there are concerns like this in Spain.
— I’m referring to Greek bishops and priests of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Of course, Greek bishops across Europe who have Ukrainian clergy in their dioceses may have those coming either from the former UOC-MP or the OCU.
I don’t travel across Europe often, so I haven’t met Ukrainian priests personally and can’t say what the situation is, for example, in Spain. But when it comes to Italy, the priests I’ve met there hold a clearly pro-Ukrainian stance. As for other countries, I simply don’t have firsthand information.
— What is your community like in Austria and Hungary? Where do your parishioners come from? Are there people who were formerly with the MP?
— Our community brings together people from all regions of Ukraine. It brings us great joy that our parishioners represent the whole of Ukraine. Many of them previously attended UOC-MP churches, but today they are active members of our communities under the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Our Church is the Mother Church, so it welcomes everyone, regardless of nationality or language.
— Have you personally interacted with people who were part of the Moscow Patriarchate either in Ukraine or elsewhere? Do you observe any shifts in their religious worldview as a result? Do they differ in any way from other believers?
— Certainly, I frequently speak with people who used to attend the UOC-MP, and many of them come to me for confession. What I can say with certainty is that people often simply lack information. Many of them, before meeting us, had fallen victim to Russian propaganda in Ukraine, and thus believed that the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Patriarchate of Constantinople were enemies.
But once they come here and encounter Greek tradition, they realize that it was all propaganda—and that in Greek traditions, there is a greater spirit of freedom, not coercion or fanaticism.
I believe they do not differ from believers of other backgrounds. They often display deep faith and reverence for God. As we’ve noted, the main issue is the lack of trustworthy information.
— There is a long-standing UGCC (Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church) community in Austria. What are your relations with them? Do Orthodox Ukrainians have any prejudice against Ukrainian Greek Catholics, and vice versa?
— Thank God, we have very good relations with UGCC communities and clergy. We often organize joint events and prayers, especially for commemorations such as the Holodomor, the war, and other events connected to our shared history and culture.
— Western Europe is often described as secularized. What is your impression from within, particularly in Austria? Do people still greet each other with "Grüß Gott"?
— Western Europe is indeed considered secularized, and Austria is no exception. However, looking from the inside, religion still plays a certain role here, especially in more traditional regions and among the older generation. The phrase "Grüß Gott" is still widely used, particularly in rural areas, small towns, and among people who maintain traditional customs.
In large cities like Vienna, you’re more likely to hear "Guten Tag", "Grüß dich", or simply "Hallo", especially among younger people and in more cosmopolitan settings.
That said, even in the capital, "Grüß Gott" is not considered outdated—you can still hear it in service settings, official institutions, or from individuals who preserve a more traditional manner of speaking. So while Austria is part of secularized Europe, it has its own particularities where religious traditions are still noticeably present.
— You’re originally from Halychyna (Galicia). Are there any parallels in terms of greetings or the presence of faith in the public space? Perhaps also in terms of customs and traditions, such as those surrounding Christmas?
— In Halychyna, the greeting “Glory to Jesus Christ” was—and in some places still is—common. It parallels Austria’s “Grüß Gott!” Both greetings reflect a deeply religious culture and were once considered normal even in secular settings.
Nativity plays (Krippenspiele) are also a shared tradition. In both Galicia and Austria, these dramatized scenes of Christ’s birth are staged, often in churches or public squares.
The Holy Supper (Heilige Nacht) differs slightly: in Galicia, it’s traditionally made up of 12 meatless dishes, while in Austria, the fasting tradition is less strict. Nevertheless, the festive dinner also takes place on December 24 in Austria and may include fried carp or meat dishes like fondue, raclette, goose, or duck.
Caroling and Christmas songs are strongly rooted in both cultures. The well-known Austrian hymn “Stille Nacht” (Silent Night) is beloved in Galicia too. Additionally, the tradition of going door to door singing carols is shared, similar to Alpine traditions of Christmas choirs.
Christmas markets (Weihnachtsmärkte) are a big part of Austrian culture, and this tradition has also reached Galicia, though on a smaller scale.
Another interesting comparison is St. Nicholas Day, which has similarities and differences in both regions.
In Galicia, children write letters to St. Nicholas and receive gifts under their pillows or in their shoes on the night of December 5–6. If they’ve misbehaved, they might get a symbolic twig instead. It’s a family-centered holiday, often with children’s performances and charity events.
In Austria, St. Nicholas also leaves gifts in children’s shoes or little sacks, but he’s often accompanied by Krampus, a frightening figure who scares misbehaving children. On December 5, there are Krampuslauf parades—dramatic and theatrical processions featuring Krampus figures, which create a unique and memorable Austrian holiday atmosphere.
— How do Austrians perceive Orthodoxy? What associations do they have with it?
— Orthodoxy is generally associated with Eastern European and Balkan countries such as Serbia, Greece, Romania, Ukraine, and Russia, and is often perceived as a religion of immigrants.
Austria has an old Greek community, so Orthodoxy is also linked to Greek tradition. Greek Orthodox churches in Vienna are well integrated into the historical fabric of the city. Many Austrians travel to Greece for summer vacations, where they become familiar with Orthodox Greek culture, which they often find very appealing. As a result, quite a few Austrians convert to Orthodoxy.
Orthodoxy is also associated with Serbs, Romanians, Bulgarians, and Ukrainians, as they make up the majority of the Orthodox population in the country.
Due to the historical and political influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, many Austrians previously associated Orthodoxy with Russia—an association that has taken on a negative connotation since 2022. However, since the beginning of the full-scale war, the distinction between Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Russian Orthodoxy has become more visible.
It should also be noted that each year, about 80,000 Austrians formally leave the Roman Catholic Church and declare themselves atheists. Many of them convert to Orthodoxy. We offer the Divine Liturgy in German in parallel, and currently, many Austrians are undergoing catechesis in preparation for joining the Orthodox Church. This trend is growing year by year.
— At the prayer for Ukraine held at St. Stephen's Cathedral on February 24, where representatives of various Churches prayed under the leadership of Cardinal Schönborn, you and some Orthodox representatives were present. Who exactly participated, and how do other Orthodox churches view the situation in Ukraine? You mentioned Romanians, Serbs, and Greeks. What is the general sentiment in their circles?
— Regarding the prayer marking the third anniversary of the war, it should be noted that among the Orthodox representatives, only our Metropolitan Arsenios and the Ukrainian priests of our diocese under the Ecumenical Patriarchate were present. Other Orthodox Churches did not send representatives. This is likely because, at all official events—whether involving state officials or religious gatherings—our Metropolitan Arsenios represents all Orthodox Christians, and his presence is generally considered sufficient.
As for the Greeks and Romanians, they support Ukraine and help Ukrainians. The Serbian Orthodox Church, however, is more focused on assisting Ukrainians who belong to the Moscow Patriarchate.
— For state institutions, perhaps Metropolitan Arsenios’ presence as the representative of Orthodoxy in Austria is sufficient. However, for our faithful, it would be meaningful to see signs of solidarity and concern from other Orthodox Churches. Meanwhile, the Romanian Orthodox Church now wants to establish its own canonical jurisdiction on the territory of Ukraine, which is perceived as an unfriendly move—almost a form of blackmail—especially since these actions are supported by state structures in Romania itself. In your view, could this indicate indifference to Ukraine's plight among other Orthodox communities?
— It is worth noting that the Romanian Orthodox Church has not officially recognized the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which influences the thinking of Romanian-speaking communities in Ukraine and affects their ecclesiastical allegiance.
In 2010, the Romanian Orthodox Church began constructing a church in Jericho without the permission of the Jerusalem Patriarchate, which caused a conflict. In 2011, the Jerusalem Patriarchate suspended Eucharistic communion with the Romanian Church. After negotiations in 2014, the church was granted the status of a “House for Romanian Pilgrims,” and the conflict was resolved.
The Romanian Orthodox Church has, on multiple occasions, intervened in the canonical territories of other Orthodox churches.
Unfortunately, today Orthodoxy is divided, and there is no unity. This, of course, affects both the support for autocephaly in Ukraine and the support for Ukrainians who are living through war.
— The Russian government actively uses the ROC network to promote its interests. Russian embassies around the world also serve as centers of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir). In your opinion, what should our government officials—especially diplomats—do to defend Ukraine’s position regarding this abuse of religious networks by the Kremlin?
— In my opinion, Ukrainian government officials and diplomats must take a comprehensive approach to counter the Kremlin’s abuse of religious networks. First, they should actively inform international partners about how the Russian Orthodox Church is being used as a tool of political influence and propaganda. Second, it is necessary to initiate sanctions against ROC representatives who support Russia’s aggressive policies. Third, Ukraine must strengthen its informational response, exposing the ROC’s ties to Russian intelligence services and its role in hybrid warfare. It is also crucial to support Ukrainian religious communities and cooperate with international organizations to limit the Kremlin’s influence through religious structures.
Additionally, efforts should be made to secure funding for the development of Ukrainian parishes in Europe. This can be achieved through state grants, collaboration with the Ukrainian diaspora, and partnerships with international foundations that support religious freedom and counter Russian propaganda. State support and diplomatic initiatives could play a significant role in helping Ukrainian church communities grow and become viable alternatives to the ROC’s influence in Europe.
Ukrainian diplomatic missions could also assist in identifying potential donors among wealthy Ukrainians, international business leaders, and organizations interested in strengthening Ukrainian identity and supporting Ukrainian Orthodox parishes abroad.
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