The network of Russian Orthodox churches in Europe adjusts its activities to the specific circumstances of each country and often presents itself as Ukrainian religious organizations to influence Ukrainian refugees.
According to Ukrinform, this is highlighted by the study “The ROC in Europe: Infrastructure of Russian Influence,” which was presented on Friday and prepared by the Institute of National Resilience and Security.
According to researchers, Russian Orthodoxy in Europe does not function as a single ecclesiastical entity but rather as a network comprising three jurisdictions: the Russian Orthodox Church (which has up to 380 parishes), the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (with up to 150 parishes), and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (which has up to 130 parishes). In total, these jurisdictions encompass approximately 1 to 1.2 million believers.
Germany hosts the largest number of these church structures, with 130 parishes, while Poland has the fewest, totaling up to 15.
The study also indicates that Moscow tailors its strategy to each country's specific conditions, employing tactics such as aggressive expansion, infiltrating local elites, masquerading as Ukrainian organizations, or addressing social needs otherwise overlooked.
To recruit Ukrainian refugees, the Russian network employs children’s centers, psychological training sessions, and humanitarian aid, while also disguising itself as Ukrainian church communities. Services are conducted in Ukrainian or in both languages, and the network uses Ukrainian names and symbols.
The study’s authors caution against Russian influence through Telegram channels that masquerade as Ukrainian news outlets. They argue that this makes Ukrainians more susceptible to Russian information operations. Based on a survey of the Ukrainian diaspora, researchers concluded that Russian propaganda promotes similar narratives: “Ukraine does not value its own people” and “we cannot survive without Russia,” which appeal to feelings of disappointment.
Rena Marutyan, director of the Institute of National Resilience and Security, noted that Telegram channels adapt more quickly than Russian state media. These channels conduct hybrid operations targeting readers; for instance, the channels ‘Molitva Slov’ and ‘Spas’ have 5 million subscribers across Europe.
Additionally, the study's authors point out that there are only 15 parishes of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in Germany and Poland. Their activities largely depend on the initiative of priests. They urge the state to provide financial support for chaplaincy missions, expand the Orthodox Church of Ukraine’s presence abroad, expose attempts by the Russian Orthodox Church to disguise its structures, and foster cooperation with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.
Analysts estimate that this network’s activities are funded by the Russian state budget and Russian state-owned corporations — including Rosatom and Gazprom — through specific European grants (especially in Belgium), as well as by private donors such as Konstantin Malofeev, Vladimir Yakunin, and Vadym Novynskyi.
Earlier, Rena Marutyan stated that Russia utilizes an extensive network of religious, media, cultural, civic, and political organizations that reinforce one another to exert hybrid influence on Ukrainian communities in EU countries.