Source: Public Orthodoxy
Editor’s note. In the spring of 2025, a new English‑language media project began to operate actively in the United States under the name “Union of Orthodox Journalists” (in Ukrainian, Spilka Pravoslavnykh Zhurnalistiv, often abbreviated as SPZh; hereafter UOJ‑SPZh, or simply UOJ). It presents itself as a platform that will “objectively cover the life of Orthodox communities” and “defend canonical Orthodoxy.” For many Orthodox Christians in North America, this name may sound trustworthy—even pious.
For readers in Ukraine, however, where this project first emerged and took shape, the brand UOJ‑SPZh carries a very specific church‑political meaning. It has been an active participant in a bitter church and information struggle for many years.
Now that UOJ seeks to win an American audience, Orthodox readers in the U.S. face a basic question of trust: What kind of media outlet is this? What role did it play in Ukraine during the years of dramatic church changes between 2015 and 2022? And what conclusions should those who encounter its publications on American soil draw from this record?
To help orient readers, this article offers an analytical overview prepared in Ukraine at the request of the editors.
After the events of Euromaidan—commonly known in Ukraine as the Revolution of Dignity—in the winter of 2013–2014, Ukraine found itself not only in a state of open conflict with Russia but also undergoing a deep transformation of its national identity. Religion quickly became part of a wider public debate about sovereignty, historical memory, and the country’s geopolitical direction.
Following the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014 and his flight to Russia, Ukraine turned decisively toward European integration. In this new political configuration, the churches found themselves at the center of a national crisis. A Pew Research Center study underlined that the growing tension between Ukrainian and Russian church communities could not be separated from the war between the two states: religious conflict developed in parallel with armed confrontation.[2]
The largest religious body in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC‑MP), suddenly found itself in a difficult position. Formally autonomous yet canonically tied to Moscow, it came under criticism in parts of Ukrainian society for its actual or perceived loyalty to Russia. Meanwhile the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC‑KP) and other structures campaigning for a recognized independent, autocephalous church grew stronger.
Although its name evokes a professional “union of journalists,” in practice it did not function primarily as a professional association in the usual sense. From the beginning, it operated as a media platform oriented toward the UOC‑MP’s audience and presenting itself as a defender of the “canonical Church.”
In other words, UOJ did not function primarily as a neutral information resource. In practice, it often operated as a participant — and at times even an initiator—of polemics within Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
Its editorial line was built around several core themes:
In UOJ’s publications, the UOC‑MP is consistently portrayed as a “persecuted Church” under pressure from the state and Ukrainian nationalists. This narrative resonated strongly with many believers who experienced rapid political change as a threat to spiritual stability.
One early, telling example was UOJ’s coverage of a jurisdictional conflict over a parish in the village of Ptichia. The story was presented as a “religious war” in which a legal dispute turns into a clash between people, and society feels that the law no longer restrains religious confrontation. It was not merely a report. The reader was offered an emotional “siege” perspective: “our people” are being pushed out, therefore “we need our own loud voice.”
In the mid‑2010s, Ukraine’s religious media landscape was highly fragmented. There were official diocesan websites, small portals, countless re‑posts, and very little original reporting. UOJ chose a model in which conflict is not an occasional storyline but the constant backdrop that builds audience loyalty. Local stories like Ptichia were turned into “symptoms of the country,” and the reader was placed firmly inside a camp that needed to be defended.
In 2016, UOJ devoted extensive coverage to the nationwide cross‑procession of the UOC‑MP, bringing in prominent figures who blurred the boundaries between church commentary and political analysis. In one article summing up the procession, UOJ mentioned the TV channel Inter, Ukrainian TV host and political strategist Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, and “Russian church resources” as media actors that shaped the narrative of the event and “blurred the wording.” Already at this stage, the church agenda was operating in a competitive media space where the question “who is telling the story, and why?” had itself become part of the Orthodox debate.
A distinctive feature of UOJ’s style was its use of authors who explicitly linked church issues with broader political analysis. In commentaries featuring Pikhovshek, for example, readers encountered claims about a “high probability of religious war” in Ukraine. The logic of such texts did more than describe an existing conflict. It normalized the expectation of escalation: if “church seizures” happen every day, then escalation can come to be perceived as almost inevitable, and responsibility is increasingly attributed not to specific decisions or actors but to a broader, almost fatalistic historical trajectory.
In the same year, UOJ and Pikhovshek presented commentaries on Ukraine’s turn toward Europe and the United States as the result of “Western pressure,” followed by disillusionment when “the West did not take Russia’s place.” This is how a geopolitical template about “Western pressure” was introduced into a church audience well before the 2018–2019 Tomos and later used to explain church crises through the lens of “Washington’s interference.”
As UOJ’s profile grew, so did public criticism. In 2016, the Religious Information Service of Ukraine (RISU) published a piece that, citing comments by Anton Herashchenko (then a public security official), urged Ukrainian security services to examine UOJ’s activity. In the same text, UOJ was described as largely anonymous and manipulative, and some critics went so far as to describe UOJ as “pro‑Kremlin.”
One may debate the tone of that criticism, but one fact is hard to ignore: from its early years, UOJ did not function as “just another religious website.” It existed in a constant state of public dispute over the nature of its mission and its political loyalties.
UOJ’s response was formulated as a kind of “trust contract” with its readership. On its “About Us” page, the project described itself as an answer to a “church‑political crisis,” emphasized the need to “form opinion leaders within the Orthodox environment,” promised “objective assessments” and a “fight against manipulation,” and highlighted a conservative value identity.
For an American reader, the key point here is that UOJ did not see itself simply as a news service. From the start it presented itself as a project closely aligned with, and supportive of, a particular conservative current within contemporary Orthodoxy.
Within two or three years, UOJ had become one of the most visible Orthodox media outlets in Ukraine. Its strength lay in clear niche positioning. Alongside polemical materials, it published pastoral and catechetical pieces — a typical “soft packaging” strategy. A reader might come for “ordinary” information about Orthodoxy and, in the process, absorb hard geopolitical interpretations presented as natural extensions of spiritual truths.
The site published dozens of items every day: news, interviews, analytical articles, and clergy video messages. An academic study at the National University “Ostroh Academy”—one of Ukraine’s leading humanities universities—noted that as of January 5, 2022, the Facebook page “Union of Orthodox Journalists —SPZh” had 56,080 followers and used conflict‑laden vocabulary and delegitimizing labels about its opponents, and the authors of the study characterize the page as representing “the most radical segment” of the UOC‑MP.
According to the analytics service Social Blade, the UOJ YouTube channel, launched on March 9, 2015, has amassed tens of millions of views and tens of thousands of subscribers; videos focusing on “church seizures” and parish conflicts spread far beyond Ukraine. Taken together, these data suggest that UOJ can be viewed as a significant media infrastructure consistently advancing a particular interpretive line, rather than as a marginal blog.
The creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in 2018 and the granting of a Tomos of autocephaly by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2019 marked a turning point. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) responded by breaking eucharistic communion with Constantinople. The church chronicle of events in Ukraine thus became a component of a global conflict within the Orthodox world.
Analysts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace interpreted this step as a demonstrative signal of Moscow’s profound displeasure with Constantinople’s actions. For ordinary believers, it meant that disputes over jurisdiction in Ukrainian villages now played out against the backdrop of a worldwide Orthodox crisis—an ideal environment for media adept at “translating canon law into the language of siege.”
It was in this atmosphere that UOJ fully settled into the role of a media actor shaped by ongoing conflict. The outlet did not so much present a complex picture of Ukraine’s religious landscape as offer an ideologically loaded narrative: it spelled out who is “canonical” and who is “schismatic,” who is “victim” and who is “aggressor,” why the state “applies pressure,” and how “the West interferes.” Such a narrative is well suited for mobilization and can easily outcompete more cautious or balanced reporting.
In January 2019, UOJ published a lengthy article by Kirill Aleksandrov arguing that Constantinople’s Tomos did not grant Ukraine genuine autocephaly but instead introduced a new form of dependence, using the image of an “exarchate.” This is a textbook example of UOJ’s editorial method: a complex canonical document is framed as a “revelation” that promises readers access to a hidden meaning that “others are trying to conceal.”
At the same time, UOJ cultivated what might be called a genre of “permanent anxiety.” In December 2018, articles spoke of “monstrous pressure” on the UOC‑MP and predicted even greater persecution after the “unification council.” Such texts gradually make the liturgical calendar feel like a calendar of looming threats, making the outlet a key point of reference for those who see themselves as “standing on the front line.”
During this period, UOJ published materials alleging “U.S. State Department pressure on the Phanar” and suggesting that belief in autocephaly was equivalent to belief “in the omnipotence of the United States.” No independent evidentiary basis was provided for such claims, yet their role is transparent: they fix a causal chain in the reader’s mind— “key church decisions are made under American pressure.” For many observers, this kind of framing raises questions about selectivity and possible manipulation, because it inserts the United States as a central player in church disputes without presenting commensurate evidence.
Throughout these years, UOJ engaged in polemics with the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, with RISU, and with journalists who supported autocephaly. Mutual accusations of manipulation and distortion of facts became routine. Critics charged that UOJ used emotionally loaded language and one‑sided framing that intensified social polarization.
By 2018, the controversy around UOJ had escalated into open conflict. The Ukrainian news agency UNIAN reported a press conference where UOJ representatives claimed that activists from the far‑right Ukrainian nationalist group C14 (Sich 14) blocked the outlet’s office, disrupted its work, and harassed its staff. UOJ’s director, Anna Poddubna, spoke of masked intruders and the inadequate, delayed response of the authorities. For a media outlet that builds much of its credibility on a narrative of “persecution,” such episodes function as experiential confirmation: if “we are under attack,” then “we must be telling the truth.”
In the spring of 2018, criticism came directly from the state. RISU reprinted a statement from the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine that cited an “escalation of confrontational rhetoric” in UOJ publications and gave examples of headlines with sacral‑punitive logic, such as “God punished the occupiers…”. The concern was not only about UOJ’s political stance but about the risk that such framing could incite hatred and reinforce discrimination.
UOJ responded in a counter‑attack style, accusing the state of double standards and of ignoring pressure on the UOC‑MP while blaming UOJ for documenting conflicts. This is characteristic of the outlet’s rhetorical technique: instead of discussing whether the language it uses is responsible or accurate, the debate is shifted to “why do you stay silent about our suffering?” For an audience already convinced that it lives in a “besieged fortress,” this strategy often proves more persuasive for such an audience than more technical conversations about journalistic ethics.
There are no publicly available documents that formally designate UOJ as an official organ of the UOC‑MP. Yet there are clear signs of what might be called “structures of legitimation.” UOJ itself states that it operates within the Orthodox environment and seeks to influence opinion leaders. The outlet has been integrated into media events around the UOC‑MP, hosting telemarathons and discussions with clergy and laity that offered a coordinated narrative of events.
Researchers and journalists have named several key figures associated with UOJ, including businessman Viktor Vyshnevetsky (founder of the company Coal Energy and of the UOJ site), editor Alexei Zoschuk, director Anna Poddubna, and other authors and editors. Their publications formed the ideological core of the outlet. Some of them simultaneously worked with official UOC‑MP church media, spoke at conferences, and appeared on broadcasts, shaping an expert field around the UOC‑MP.
From early on, UOJ was accused of promoting narratives that closely match positions of the ROC and official Russian state rhetoric. In UOJ materials, Ukrainian autocephaly and the Ecumenical Patriarchate are frequently depicted through the storyline of “Western interference,” with the United States portrayed as a key factor supporting the OCU—a frame that overlaps in important ways with broader Russian discourse about a “geopolitical project.” At this point, in the eyes of many observers, the debate around UOJ extends beyond doctrinal questions into the realm of political narratives that shape how believers perceive both America and the Ukrainian church situation.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in its report The Kremlin Playbook 3: Keeping the Faith, analyzes the use of religion and “traditional values” as tools in Russia’s malign influence operations and explicitly mentions the Union of Orthodox Journalists in this context, linking the project to support for Metropolitan Onufriy (Berezovsky), head of the UOC‑MP, and noting UOJ’s dissemination of unreliable reports about the United States and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. For many policy experts, this discussion is a signal that UOJ can be considered within a broader ecosystem of Russian information influence, even if its precise place and role within that ecosystem remain matters of interpretation.
After Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ukrainian authorities tightened oversight of media suspected of spreading pro‑Russian narratives. In this environment, UOJ’s activities came under close scrutiny from both law‑enforcement and regulatory bodies.
Within a pre‑trial investigation opened by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) on July 21, 2023 (case № 22023101110000608), investigators argued that the actions of UOJ staff formed part of a “criminal plan” aimed at inciting religious enmity, supporting the aggressor state, undermining trust in Ukrainian society, and drawing Ukraine back into the religious, cultural, and political orbit of Russia.
According to the SBU, UOJ contributed to disseminating information harmful to Ukraine’s state and information security and thus assisted Russian actors in their subversive activities in the religious and media spheres.
Following a request from the SBU, the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine issued order № 920/2725 on November 15, 2024, instructing internet providers to block a number of domains on Ukrainian territory, including domains associated with UOJ.
In 2024, Ukrainian media discussed not only the blocking of domains. The outlet Detector Media reported that UOJ had announced SBU searches at its editorial office; sources linked this episode to an investigation of a Russian “agent network” in the information sphere. These allegations still require judicial review and do not themselves constitute a verdict. Nonetheless, they illustrate that in Ukraine, UOJ was increasingly perceived not simply as a religious media site but as a potential participant in information operations with implications for national security.
Later, in 2025, Ukrainian outlets reported that the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) had imposed sanctions that included the UOJ website among their targets. Sanctions are a political decision rather than a court judgment. Still, they express an institutional assessment of risk on the part of the state. It is important to note that before 2022 there were no public reports of a classical court‑ordered “ban” on UOJ; it was only in the post‑invasion period that the format of restrictions became much more stringent.
For UOJ’s supporters, these developments became further evidence of a narrative of “persecution of canonical Orthodoxy.” For its critics, they appeared as the predictable outcome of a long‑standing editorial line. Either way, once UOJ seeks to expand into the American information space, its record in 2015–2022 ceases to be an “internal Ukrainian affair” and becomes a question of information hygiene for Orthodox communities in the United States and beyond.
UOJ’s entry into the American media environment takes place under different legal and social conditions. In the United States, freedom of speech is strongly protected, and church life follows its own historical trajectories, quite distinct from those of Ukraine and Europe. Yet the basic question remains the same: can this outlet reasonably be regarded as a neutral and reliable source of information once its Ukrainian history is taken into account?
The trajectory of UOJ suggests that it developed less as a detached observer and more as an active, highly ideological participant in intra‑Orthodox battles. Its coverage consistently centers on defending a specific ecclesiological position and attacking alternative models of church governance, often using emotionally charged language and a “besieged fortress” mentality.
The Ukrainian story of UOJ offers a case study in how religious journalism can become part of a broader information struggle and how conflicts can be exported from one national context into another. In an era of global media, projects like UOJ can easily switch languages and audiences while preserving their existing interpretive frameworks.
For Orthodox Christians in the United States, this is not a call to censorship or to shutting down debate. It is, rather, a call to critical engagement—to understanding the historical and political environment in which UOJ’s church and ideological identity took shape.
The practical question facing an American reader is straightforward: to what extent do you see in UOJ an independent Orthodox journalism project, and to what extent an engaged media platform whose identity was forged in the heat of acute political and ecclesial confrontation? Answering that question requires less emotion and more knowledge of history. The years 2015–2022 in Ukraine should remain in view when UOJ now speaks in the name of a “global Orthodox community,” so that a painful habit of searching for “internal enemies” and deepening divisions does not migrate from Ukraine into other Orthodox contexts.