Presentation at the XVI International Scientific and Practical Conference “Spiritual and Secular Education: History of Relationships - Modernity - Prospects” at the KTAaS (Kyiv Theological Academy and Seminary of Ukrainian Orthodox Church)
Source: KTAaS website
On August 20, 2024, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed the law "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Activities of Religious Organizations" (No. 3894-IX), and it was signed by the President of Ukraine on August 24[1].
This law prohibits the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, as well as Ukrainian religious communities affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church. Additionally, the new law provides for the possibility of banning religious organizations if they engage in promoting the ideology of the "Russian World"[2]. The law specifies that this includes the spread of such ideology “by the religious organization itself, its charter or governing bodies, or by other individuals acting on its behalf by assignment, with permission, or through other forms of coordination, regardless of the nature of this coordination” (Section I, Article 5, Clause 1).
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is expected to soon pass a resolution detailing the procedures for investigating cases where religious organizations are used to promote the ideology of the "Russian World." This implies that the process for banning a religious organization on the grounds of ideological propaganda for the “Russian World” will be distinct from the process used to ban organizations affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate.
Therefore, lawsuits against religious organizations suspected of promoting the ideology of the "Russian World" may soon arise. As a result, it is essential for government agencies, religious communities, and scholars to understand what the ideology of the "Russian World" entails. What are its defining characteristics? In which official documents, public statements, or scholarly publications has this ideology been articulated?
It should be stated right away that this is an extremely challenging task. First, at different times, various Russian scholars, as well as political, public, ecclesiastical, and cultural figures, have expressed a wide range of opinions regarding the "Russian World." Second, there is no regulatory document in which the Russian state or the Russian church leadership has officially formulated the doctrine of the "Russian World."
At the same time, there is no doubt that the ideology of the "Russian World" is used by the Russian state to justify military aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, it is crucial that we pay particular attention to analyzing this ideology.
Although the concept of the "Russian World" somewhat builds upon ideas from Russian philosophers of the 19th and early 20th centuries, it’s important to emphasize that this term, in its modern sense, only began to be used in the late 1990s. This development was closely tied to the political trajectory of Russia at that time.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term "near abroad" became firmly established in Russian political vocabulary. This term referred to the countries of the former Soviet Union that had gained independence. Russia consistently viewed the "near abroad" as a zone of its own interests. Simply put, Russia has continually sought to assert its economic and cultural dominance in this region.
In 1995, Russian political strategist Gleb Pavlovsky founded the Russian Institute in Moscow. This institution became a gathering point for intellectuals who began crafting Russia’s strategy towards the “near abroad” countries. Interestingly, among these thinkers were individuals well-versed in the legacy of Russian philosophers from the late 19th to early 20th century—figures like Vladimir Solovyov, Konstantin Leontiev, Sergei Bulgakov, Pavel Florensky, and Nikolai Berdyaev. This philosophical heritage included deep reflections on the so-called “Russian idea.” On the other hand, both Pavlovsky and his colleagues were involved in marketing and PR strategies. This unexpected combination of philosophical and promotional elements ultimately led to the emergence of the “Russian World” concept.
The concept of the “Russian World” finds its roots in Russian philosopher Mikhail Gefter’s idea of a “World of Worlds.” Gefter envisioned humanity as a vast World in which various worlds coexist freely, suggesting that humanity is, in essence, a “World of Worlds.” As early as 1989, reflecting on humanity’s shift away from a bipolar world—marked by the struggle between the capitalist and socialist blocs—Gefter argued that the new world order should embrace a diversity of worlds, “each of which has a vested interest in ensuring that others are unlike itself, preserving and enriching their "distinctiveness"[3].
It's worth noting that Gleb Pavlovsky was a student of Mikhail Gefter, so it comes as no surprise that Gefter’s ideas were further developed by thinkers in Pavlovsky’s circle in the late 1990s. This group included figures such as Petr Shchedrovitsky and Efim Ostrovsky. According to Shchedrovitsky himself, the term “Russian World” was first used in 1998[4]. At that time, Shchedrovitsky and Ostrovsky co-authored an article titled "Russia: The Country That Never Was"[5]. It expanded on Hefter's idea of the "World of Worlds." The authors argued that the modern world consists not just of states, but of various networks of connections, with each network representing a distinct "world" being part of the greater World. One such network, they posited, was the "Russian World," which they defined as "a new system of connections among Russians." They emphasized that the "Russian World" was not confined to the territory of Russia but extended far beyond its borders. The authors predicted that the next "Fourth World War" would be fought on geo-economic and cultural-political fronts, not with military weaponry but with humanitarian and technological tools. Therefore, they suggested creating a new "image" for Russia, as this emerging global confrontation would be a clash not of nations but of images and brands.
Thus, in 1998, the concept of the "Russian World" was oriented towards globalization processes. The authors of this idea sought to create a new international "brand" or "image" of Russia. This image was intended to appeal to everyone living outside Russia who identified with Russian culture. Consequently, the concept of the "Russian World" was meant to serve as a safeguard against Russia's isolation.
At the same time, as noted by French researcher Marlène Laruelle, the concept of the "Russian World," created in the late 1990s, exhibited clear messianic traits. Shchedrovitsky and Ostrovsky believed that Russia had a special message to convey to the world. Thus, the early version of the "Russian World" concept intriguingly combined elements of marketing with a sense of messianism[6].
In 1999, Petr Shchedrovitsky added another important aspect to the concept of the "Russian World." In his foundational article "Russian World and Transnational Russian," he wrote that the "Russian World" is a "network structure of large and small communities that think and speak in the Russian language"[7]. This definition is critically significant. Shchedrovitsky established the Russian language as the key identifier of the "Russian World."
If, in the late 1990s, the "Russian World" was a concept discussed among a narrow circle of intellectuals, by the early 2000s, it had been adopted by the Russian political leadership. In 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin first used the term in one of his speeches. On October 11, 2001, during his address at the First World Congress of Compatriots, he stated, "The concept of 'the Russian World' has historically extended far beyond the geographical borders of Russia and even beyond the boundaries of the Russian ethnic group”[8]. Within the logic of this speech, the "Russian World" represents a community of people of various nationalities living both in Russia and abroad. All of them consider the Russian language and culture to be native to them. Therefore, these individuals, no matter where they reside, are regarded as "compatriots" (in Russian, "соотечественники"). As Putin stated at the time, this community includes millions of people who "speak, think, and perhaps even more importantly, feel in Russian." He even described belonging to this community as a matter of "spiritual self-determination."
There is no doubt that the ideas expressed by Putin in 2001 originated from the intellectual circle that had been developing these concepts in the late 1990s. It is well known that in the early years of Putin's presidency, Gleb Pavlovsky was one of the Kremlin's chief political strategists. It was likely through him that these ideas reached the highest echelons of the Kremlin.
This broader political context is crucial for understanding the genesis of the "Russian World" concept. This concept clearly reflected the Russian leadership's ambition to establish dominance in the so-called "near abroad." Wherever there are people who speak Russian and cherish Russian culture, there exists the "Russian World," and consequently, there lie Russia's geopolitical interests.
A new stage in the development of the "Russian World" doctrine began after Ukraine's Orange Revolution. The events of 2004 in Kyiv marked a complete failure of the Russian political leadership’s attempts to assert control over Ukraine. Notably, Gleb Pavlovsky was among those working on behalf of Viktor Yanukovych at the time.
Following 2004, the Russian Federation placed significant emphasis on its policies toward the "near abroad," particularly Ukraine. The primary goal became countering so-called "color revolutions" and preventing a similar uprising within Russia. This policy was overseen by Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which operated a specialized division. In 2008, this division was officially named the "Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation," or "Rossotrudnichestvo" for short.
Russia’s strategy for influencing the "near abroad" at the time included a broad array of measures falling under the concept of "soft power." The term "soft power" was introduced into academic discourse by American political scientist Joseph S. Nye, Jr. It refers to achieving desired outcomes through voluntary attraction and appeal, as opposed to "hard power," which relies on coercion[9].
Marlène Laruelle identifies several key directions of Russian activity in the "near abroad." First, there were investments in the economies of "post-Soviet" countries aimed at strengthening Russia's economic influence in these regions. Second, Russia funded pro-Russian political parties, non-governmental organizations, and social movements. Third, it promoted Russian culture and language, establishing a network of Russian cultural centers, often operating out of Russian embassies. For instance, such a center existed in Kyiv. Russian embassies also took an active role in preserving historical monuments related to Russia or initiated and financed the creation of new ones.
Fourth, this policy encouraged the repatriation of ethnic Russians to the Russian Federation. Finally, it was during this period that the practice of issuing Russian passports to former Soviet citizens residing in the "near abroad" was formalized. This process became widespread in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria. In Ukraine, a significant percentage of Russian passport holders were in Crimea, a region with a substantial presence of Russian military personnel who often settled there after completing their service. These measures provided Russia with a pretext to claim the need to protect its citizens in these regions[10].
In 2007, Putin established the "Russian World" Foundation by presidential decree. This public non-profit organization focuses on promoting the Russian language and culture, as well as supporting Russian language education programs worldwide[11]. The "Russian World" Foundation largely carries out activities similar to those of "Rossotrudnichestvo." However, there are notable differences: "Rossotrudnichestvo" is a state organization, while the foundation is not. Additionally, "Rossotrudnichestvo" traditionally focuses on the "near abroad," whereas the "Russian World" Foundation implements programs globally. Despite not being a state institution, the foundation receives funding, including from the Russian government, and operates in alignment with Russia's foreign policy interests.
By 2008, the term "Russian World" had firmly established itself in Russian political discourse. It was used not only by philosophers, marketers, and PR managers but also by top state officials. The Kremlin-aligned "Russian World" Foundation was actively operating.
In 2009, the concept of the "Russian World" took on new dimensions of meaning with the election of Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyaev) as Patriarch of Moscow.
Patriarch Kirill first publicly outlined his interpretation of the "Russian World" during his visit to Ukraine in the summer of 2009. Although the term "Russian World" was not explicitly mentioned in his speeches in Ukraine, the key elements of this doctrine were clearly articulated. Later that year, on November 3, speaking at the III Assembly of the "Russian World" Foundation, Patriarch Kirill presented a more detailed vision of the "Russian World" according to his perspective. The main components of this doctrine, as defined by Patriarch Kirill, are as follows.
First and foremost, Patriarch Kirill began actively employing a civilizational approach to describe the "Russian World." In his view, the "Russian World" was no longer merely a "network" of communities speaking and thinking in Russian. For Patriarch Kirill, the "Russian World" represented a distinct civilization encompassing multiple countries. As Patriarch Kirill claimed, the nations of the "Russian World" "belong to a single, unique civilizational space." The foundation of this civilization, according to him, is "the Orthodox faith, which we received together in the common baptismal font of Kyiv." Thus, the unity of the "Russian World" is based on "the values, knowledge, and experience that have always enabled our peoples to hold a worthy place in the human family[12].
Thus, unlike Shchedrovitsky, Patriarch Kirill considers the Orthodox faith, rather than the Russian language and culture, to be the primary marker of the "Russian World." Patriarch Kirill explicitly rejected a solely "linguistic" interpretation of the "Russian World," stating, "Speaking Russian or understanding the Russian language is not the only condition for belonging to the Russian World"[13]. This new approach allowed the inclusion of non-Slavic peoples within the "Russian World." As Patriarch Kirill stated on November 3, 2009, "The Russian Orthodox Church fulfills its pastoral mission among peoples who embrace Russian spiritual and cultural tradition as the foundation of their national identity or, at the very least, as a significant part of it. That is why, in this sense, we also consider Moldova a part of this Russian World"[14].
According to Patriarch Kirill, the "Russian World" is not defined by the Russian language (as previously asserted by Shchedrovitsky) but by the territories under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarch. He articulated this position explicitly during his visit to Kyiv in the summer of 2009. Moreover, he attempted to provide historical justifications for this claim.
On July 29, 2009, during a ceremonial event at the Refectory Church of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, Patriarch Kirill presented the following argument. In the Byzantine era, there was the Pentarchy—a union of five patriarchates (Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem). After the schism between the Eastern patriarchates and Rome, the Moscow Patriarchate was incorporated into this structure in the late 16th century. At that time, the Eastern patriarchs granted the head of the Moscow Church the title: "Patriarch of Moscow, All Rus', and All Northern Lands." According to Patriarch Kirill, this title indicated that everything "north of Byzantium" was placed under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarch.
Thus, in Kirill's view, by the late 16th century, the Eastern patriarchs had collectively decided to transfer all lands north of historical Byzantium under the Moscow Patriarch's jurisdiction. He argues that this territory formed a unique "civilizational space," referred to as the "Russian World." Within this space, the Moscow Patriarch serves as the spiritual leader[15].
Interestingly, during his 2009 visit to Ukraine, Patriarch Kirill specifically emphasized that, as the spiritual leader of the "Russian World," he has the right to provide spiritual guidance to the leaders of all states within this space.
From a historical perspective, Patriarch Kirill's claims do not hold up to scrutiny. Firstly, in 1593, when the Eastern Patriarchs issued a charter recognizing the Moscow Patriarchate, the jurisdiction of the Moscow Church in no way encompassed "everything north of Byzantium." For instance, the Orthodox dioceses in the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Moldova remained under the jurisdiction of Constantinople, despite all these lands being located north of historical Byzantium. Secondly, the mention of "northern lands" in the patriarch's title was essentially a duplication of the title held by the Moscow Tsar at the time. According to the resolutions of the Council of Eastern Patriarchs on February 12, 1593, the ruler of Moscow was to be commemorated during church services as the "Tsar of Moscow and Sovereign of All Rus' and the Northern Lands." Consequently, the head of the Moscow Church was granted the title "Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus' and the Northern Lands"[16]. Thus, the title granted to the patriarch at that time carried a meaning directly opposite to what Patriarch Kirill claims! The title of the Moscow Patriarch signified that his jurisdiction was confined to the borders of the Moscow Tsardom and did not extend across multiple states. This is precisely why the titles of the tsar and the patriarch were identical in scope.
Another component of Patriarch Kirill's "Russian World" doctrine is the assertion of a single "Russian World" people. According to the patriarch, this "single people" includes contemporary Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. In 2014, he stated: "The Russian World is ... a unique civilization to which people belong who today call themselves by different names—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians"[17].
Although, in the early stages of shaping this ideology, Patriarch Kirill did not explicitly question existing state borders in his speeches, he nevertheless emphasized their conditional nature and pointed out that borders have changed many times throughout history. Today, according to Patriarch Kirill, state borders "create unnecessary obstacles between the peoples of the Russian World"[18].
Let's examine another key aspect of Patriarch Kirill's doctrine of the "Russian World." Since the foundation of the "Russian World" is the "Orthodox faith we received in the common Kyiv baptismal font," this implies that Kyiv is an integral part of the "Russian World." On July 29, 2009, in the Trapezna Church at the Lavra, Patriarch Kirill declared passionately: "Kyiv is the southern capital of Russian Orthodoxy… Kyiv is our Jerusalem and Constantinople; it is the core of our life. Can we turn a blind eye to this? To a thousand-year history? And say, '...We have been independent for twenty years, so let’s rewrite everything here.' This is not just a rejection of history. It is a rejection of the Church’s tradition."
Under this logic, the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church becomes fundamentally impossible. Referring to the decree of the Eastern Patriarchs in 1593, Patriarch Kirill asserts that the entire "Russian World" falls under the canonical jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, making it theoretically impossible for any part of this territory to separate from Moscow's authority.
Despite Patriarch Kirill framing this idea of the "indivisibility" of the "Russian World" as part of the Church’s tradition, there is no evidence of such concepts in the canonical decrees of the Eastern Church. In fact, the notion that it is inherently impossible for any Local Church to achieve autocephaly deeply contradicts Orthodox ecclesiology.
The genesis of the concept of the "Russian World" demonstrates how the interests of the Russian state and the Moscow Patriarchate were intertwined within this framework. The doctrine of the "Russian World" served both as a foundation for Russian foreign policy in the "near abroad" and as a justification for maintaining the canonical jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate in this region.
Initially, the promotion of this ideology bore the hallmarks of classic "soft power." However, Russia's policy toward its neighbors has not always been "soft." There are well-documented cases of direct military intervention by Russia in the affairs of "near abroad" countries. For instance, in 1992, Russian military involvement in Transnistria led to Moldova losing effective control over part of its territory. Russian military interventions also occurred in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan, although the Kremlin never officially acknowledged them. In 2008, Russia launched military aggression against Georgia, citing, among other reasons, the presence of Russian passport holders in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In 2014, Russia effectively annexed Ukraine's Crimea. Notably, on March 18, 2014, Vladimir Putin, in his speech justifying the annexation, referenced the doctrine of the "Russian World." However, he gave the term a somewhat new interpretation. Putin equated the "Russian World" with "historic Russia" and declared that the "Russian people" might be "the largest divided nation in the world." Accordingly, this people has the legitimate right to restore its political unity, with the annexation of Crimea proclaimed as a step toward reuniting "historic Russia"[19].
In these statements, the "Russian World" was no longer a tool of "soft power." The concept of the "Russian World" effectively transformed into an ideological justification for Russia's interference in Ukraine's internal affairs. Thus, the ideology of the "Russian World" set the stage for the mounting of military hostilities by Russia against Ukraine[20]. Some researchers, therefore, suggest defining Patriarch Kirill's activities on the international stage not as "soft power" but as "sharp power." Peter Mandaville of the United States Institute of Peace explains this term as follows: "Sharp power — as distinct from either the positive allure of soft power or the use of military force often associated with hard power — refers to the use of information, communication, and technology tools to disseminate ideas and messages likely to sow discord and tension in target societies"[21].
The doctrine of the "Russian World" fully aligns with the concept of "sharp power." Within this doctrine, Russians and Ukrainians are perceived as one people, and the state borders between them are interpreted as artificial. This perspective has been used to justify Russia's military intervention in Ukraine's internal affairs.
In 2022, the narrative that Russians and Ukrainians constitute "one people" was frequently employed by both Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill to rationalize military aggression against Ukraine. For instance, on March 20, 2022, during one of his sermons, Patriarch Kirill stated that Russians and Ukrainians are "indeed one people" who "currently live in different countries"[22].
To justify military aggression against Ukraine, Patriarch Kirill also invoked another aspect of the "Russian World" doctrine, specifically the claim that the "Russian World" unites bearers of traditional values. The modern Western world, as Patriarch Kirill stated during his speech at the Russian Federation Council in January 2022, has shifted "toward completely different—and, to put it bluntly, values hostile to Christianity. This is a fact… The elites of Western countries are engaged in a deconstruction of the Christian heritage, abandoning their spiritual roots"[23]. Thus, from Patriarch Kirill's perspective, the armed conflict with Ukraine is a civilizational clash between the "Russian World" and Western elites. Since the West seeks to impose values alien to Russia, Russia has the right to defend itself, including through the use of military force.
Today, the elements of the "Russian World" doctrine are employed by both the Russian state and the Moscow Patriarchate as an ideological justification for military aggression against Ukraine.
As we can see, the idea of the "Russian World" has undergone intriguing transformations over the past twenty-five years. According to Marlene Laruelle, the concept of the "Russian World" was initially designed to be fuzzy and elastic. This allowed its content and boundaries to be continuously adjusted and redefined. Therefore, although people often speak of the "doctrine" of the "Russian World," this concept has never been a rigid doctrine. Marlene Laruelle writes that the "Russian World" is a “geopolitical trope, a floating empty signifier open to all kinds of re-branding and re-articulation”[24].
It is no surprise, then, that the idea of the "Russian World," which emerged in the late 1990s within a relatively liberal milieu, gradually evolved into one of the ideological justifications for Russian military aggression.
Despite the fact that the idea of the "Russian World" has been echoed in Patriarch Kirill's public addresses (including his sermons) over many years, it cannot be considered part of church doctrine. Moreover, in my opinion, this idea is not theological at all. It does not contain teachings about God, His relationship with the world, or humanity. As we have seen, the roots of this ideology are linked to marketing and PR technologies, not theology. While Patriarch Kirill has attempted to give this ideology the appearance of church teaching, it is quite evident that the concept of the "Russian World" has a completely different nature. In Patriarch Kirill's speeches, the ideology of the "Russian World" has transformed into what can be called a civic religion, which should not be confused with divinely revealed doctrine.
Footnotes:
[1] Law of Ukraine "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations" (No. 3894-IX). [Electronic resource:] https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3894-20#Text. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[2] Hereafter, we use this phrase in Russian in quotation marks. All quotations from Russian-language texts are also provided in the original.
[3] Гефтер М. Мир миров: российский зачин. (Gefter M. Mir mirov: rossiyskiy zachin.) [Electronic resource:] https://archipelag.ru/ru_mir/history/history95-97/gefter-zachin/. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[4] The Russian World: Restoring the Context. A conversation with the author of the concept of the Russian World, philosopher, and head of the School of Cultural Policy, Pyotr Georgievich Shchedrovitsky. Sergey Gradirovsky and Boris Mezhuev participated in the discussion. September 2001. [Electronic resource:] https://archipelag.ru/ru_mir/history/history01/shedrovitsky-russmir/. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[5] Островский Е., Щедровицкий П. Россия: страна, которой не было. (Ostrovsky E., Shchedrovitsky P. Rossiya: strana, kotoroy ne bylo.) [Electronic resource:] https://archipelag.ru/ru_mir/history/history99-00/shedrovicky-possia-no/. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[6] Laruelle M. The “Russian World”. Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination. Washington: Center of Global Interests, 2015. P. 6.
[7] Щедровицкий П. Русский мир и транснациональное русское. (Shchedrovitsky P. Russkiy mir i transnatsionalnoe russkoe.) [Electronic resource:] https://shchedrovitskiy.com/russkiy-mir/. Date accessed: 10.10.2024.
[8] Speech at the opening of the Congress of Compatriots. October 11, 2001. [Electronic resource:] http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/comminity_meetings/21359. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[9] Cf. Nye Joseph S., Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York, 2004.
[10] Laruelle M. The “Russian World”. P. 9-11.
[11] Cf. Russkiy Mir Foundation. [Electronic resource:] https://russkiymir.ru/fund/. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[12] Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill at the ceremonial opening of the III Assembly of the Russian World. November 3, 2009. [Electronic resource:] http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/928446.html. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[13] His Holiness Patriarch Kirill: The Russian World is a special civilization that must be preserved. September 8, 2014. [Electronic resource:] http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3730705.html. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[14] Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill at the ceremonial opening of the III Assembly of the Russian World. November 3, 2009. [Electronic resource:] http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/928446.html. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[15] We are using an audio recording of Patriarch Kirill's speech from our personal collection.
[16] Act of the Council of Constantinople of 1593, which established the Patriarchate in Russia / Translated from Greek by Archimandrite Porphyry (Uspensky) // Works of the Kyiv Theological Academy. 1865. No. 10. pp. 244–245.
[17] His Holiness Patriarch Kirill: The Russian World is a special civilization that must be preserved. September 8, 2014. [Electronic resource:] http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3730705.html. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[18] Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill at the solemn opening of the III Assembly of the Russian World. November 3, 2009. [Electronic resource:] http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/928446.html. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[19] Presidential Address of the Russian Federation. March 18, 2014. [Electronic resource:] http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[20] Kilp A., Pankhurst Jerry G. Soft, Sharp, and Evil Power: The Russian Orthodox Church in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine // Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe. Vol. 42 (2022). Iss. 5. Article 2. P. 2-4.
[21] Mandaville Peter. How Putin Turned Religion’s ’Sharp Power’ Against Ukraine. February 9, 2022.
[22] Word of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on the 2nd Sunday of Great Lent after the Liturgy at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. March 20, 2022. [Electronic resource:] http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5909901.html. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[23] Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill at the 12th Christmas Parliamentary Meetings in the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. January 23, 2024. [Electronic resource:] http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6096443.html. Date accessed: October 10, 2024.
[24] Laruelle M. The “Russian World”. P. 25.