"Russian Orthodox Church priests in Norway collaborate with the Russian Embassy in one way or another," - Former MP clergyman Dmytro Ostanin

The expansionist remarks made by the Metropolitan of Murmansk of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) regarding Norwegian territory, where he has a church, have sparked public outrage. However, this situation has revealed that not all ROC clergy in the country support such a stance. Notably, among the ROC clergy who, back in March 2022, made a statement against the war is Fr Dmytro Ostanin. On July 22, 2024, the Moscow Diocesan Court, as it had done with other priests who took an anti-war stance, accused him of oath-breaking based on the 25th rule of the Holy Apostles; the court’s decision was approved by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow. Furthermore, in March 2024, he was removed from his position as rector of the Epiphany parish of the ROC in Bergen, Norway, and recalled to Moscow. However, he remained in Norway.

Father Dmytro Ostanin is originally from Dnipro and, as it turns out, speaks excellent Ukrainian, though he hasn’t been to Ukraine in a long time.

“Father, you speak beautiful Ukrainian. How do you find an opportunity to practice? And when did you visit Ukraine last time?”

"Thank you, I always reply in Ukrainian when someone addresses me in my language. In Norway, Ukrainian is now one of the most common languages. Although I haven’t been to Ukraine for over ten years, I continue using the 'nightingale' language because I work as a translator from Ukrainian to Norwegian. It’s my language.

By the way, a week ago I received a package with books from the Fabula publishing house. I’ve started reading Shalimar the Clown by Rushdie. Up next is the Report to Apostle Peter. I read this trilogy before, but I decided to reread it. I buy books from the Old Lion Publishing House, Ababahalamaha, and others. Overall, the amount of quality contemporary literature in wartime Ukraine is impressive! And by purchasing books from Ukrainian publishers, I’m also helping our military, because a portion of those funds goes toward military supplies."

“How did you end up at the parish in Norway?”

“I was appointed by the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2007. But before that, I had been to Norway as a choir conductor. It’s a very long story, just like my path to the priesthood.”

“Can you tell us how a person from Ukraine became a clergy member of the ROC, remained Ukrainian within it, and why you’ve stayed there for so long?”

“I should probably mention that during my childhood, there were no other branches of Orthodoxy apart from the ROC. We didn’t even have such a church nearby. I had to be baptized several dozen kilometers away in a village. Later, my friends and I, back in Soviet times, would travel to a neighboring city, which is now suffering greatly from the Russian invaders, to a church that is actually the oldest in the area. I should mention that a priest named Father Zayets served there (I don’t remember his first name), and he served for a very long time. And, as they said, he did so in Ukrainian. I don’t know this personally because he was already gone when we visited. Then, the construction of ROC churches began, after the fall of the USSR. But I remember that much later, the first parishes of the Kyiv Patriarchate started to appear. However, that was later, and it didn’t evoke any thoughts or feelings; in fact, it was possibly the opposite—it was all tied to the Rukh (Movement), to politics. We were still too young to be thinking about political matters.”

“During my studies in Dnipro, I attended cathedrals. There were two in the city. I sang in the choirs, went to work in the prosphora bakery, and generally lived the church life as much as I could. Later, I traveled to Chernihiv, which I fell in love with because that’s where Bishop Kronid, who had a significant influence on me, was from.

While studying at Dnipropetrovsk University, I interned at a design bureau that built airplanes in Moscow. After university, I worked there for a year. However, I felt that I was drawn to theology more than to physics and mathematics. So, I enrolled in the St. Petersburg seminary, which I completed externally. Interestingly, I didn’t get accepted the first year due to my behavior. :) The person responsible for my not getting in is now also defrocked but at the episcopal level. He was constantly involved in scandals throughout his life — this is the infamous Bishop Ignaty (Tarasov), whom the students and pupils of the seminary and academy in St. Petersburg shouted “anaxios” at during his priestly ordination, meaning “not worthy.” This was the first time in the entire history of the ROC and probably the second time in the history of Orthodoxy. By the way, this had negative consequences for the students, but not for Ignaty himself. That’s how democracy has functioned and continues to function in the ROC. In Ukraine, priests were elected by the people in ancient times, but here even a collective opinion that a candidate is unworthy of the priesthood means nothing. But I digress. The second time I applied, I did so through the Russian diocese because I wasn’t accepted by the Ukrainian one.”

“So it turned out that I’m Ukrainian but found myself outside my homeland. But it was then that I felt I was truly Ukrainian. In fact, I started writing poetry in Ukrainian when I traveled to the Solovetsky Islands! And even though they resemble Shevchenko's style, I love them. Here are a few lines:

When I remember, I weep,
Dear Ukraine, my heart does leap.
Is it just my fate to roam,
Perishing far from my home

These are, of course, adolescent poems.

I once had a blog in Russian. But my Ukrainian identity comes from there; it went into my heart and mind. Before that, it was dormant in my subconscious.

After my studies, I stayed where I was living at that time. Later, I accidentally ended up in Norway as a regent. Two years later, I was remembered and invited to the Department of External Church Relations. After that, I was ordained as a priest in Norway by the metropolitan, who later became a patriarch and who has now defrocked me. That’s my story.

Why did I stay in the ROC for so long, even though I felt like a Ukrainian? At first, as I said, I was quite an apolitical person. My interest in political issues began with the Bolotnaya protests in Russia. I started speaking out in the press against violence and for democracy. After that came the Maidan and the war. That’s when I fully realized who I am. It was then that my parish began to provide financial assistance to Ukraine, and I decided for myself that it didn’t matter what would happen to me; I would endure everything as long as I could use myself as a priest and my parish as a means to help my compatriots suffering in the war. Would I be able to help Ukraine more if I left the parish? Unfortunately, not at this time. That’s why I was defrocked, and former parishioners who left the parish, because they disagreed with my position, are now boiling with outrage that formally, even though I’ve been defrocked and removed from my position as rector, I continue to help Ukrainian refugees here in Norway. I think they will soon come to drive Ukrainians out of the church, which they consider their own.”

“Your and your colleagues’ anti-war statement was made in 2022, yet you only found yourself in court in 2024. Why this delay?”

“I think the anti-war statement wasn’t the main reason. The parish started helping Ukraine back in 2014, which caused disputes among the parishioners at that time. But my position hasn’t changed — I remain in my position because, as a priest with experience and certain administrative resources, I can bring more benefit to my country in this role. And aside from the slanders that were written about me in Moscow, accusing me of nationalism, I remained a priest with Ukrainian roots who supports his people.

But why now? Perhaps patience ran out. War propagandists in Russia wrote about me both online and directly to their leaders in Moscow. But this didn’t come as a surprise to me. I was ready for it.”

“They summoned you to Moscow back in March 2024, but you didn’t go. Why?”

“Precisely because in those reports, they were suggesting to prosecute me criminally. I wrote thoroughly to the court, explaining that I wouldn’t go because the state they were asking me to travel to is internationally recognized as a terrorist state, and Norwegian citizens are advised not to enter Russian territory due to the limited diplomatic assistance.

Moreover! I suggested that the trial be held in a Western European country, but the court, if you can even call it a court, just laughed at my reasoning.

By the way, Mr. Taras, do you know who sits in this court? As a classic of Russian literature once said: ‘And who are the judges?’ The secretary of the Moscow Eparchial Court is the rector of the church at the FSB headquarters on Lubyanka, and the person assisting the court is the warden of the same church. So the idea of going there never even crossed my mind, especially since the court's decision had already been approved much earlier and at the highest level.”

“And what’s next? Were you defrocked by the ROC? Did you file an appeal?”

“Yes, I appealed to His All-Holiness, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, and I hope to be reinstated in my duties so that I can continue to serve God and people, as I’ve done all my life.”

“So, you are no longer serving as a priest?”

“No. I’m waiting for His All-Holiness’s decision.”

“And who were or are the members of the community you led?”

“We have a great ethnic diversity. Especially at the beginning, as I was the first permanent Orthodox priest in Bergen. We had Romanians, Moldovans, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, people from the Baltics, the U.S., the U.K., Norwegians, and so on. But mostly, it was Ukrainians and Russians. Gradually, each nationality began building its own churches. The Romanians formed their parish, and then the Serbs followed. A group of Greeks from the Ecumenical Patriarchate also served in our church, led by a priest from Oslo.

Right now, it is the Ukrainians who are the heart of our parish. They are the ones who have been coming to services for the past two years. Russians come too, but only those who are against the war. The war has brought new dynamics to the parish. I deliberately did not differentiate between people of different nationalities, but many Russians left the parish because it is hard for them to sit and break bread with Ukrainians, whose relatives are being killed by their government. And I can understand them.

To stand together with Ukrainians in such times requires a high level of empathy and spiritual maturity. In these difficult times, it's crucial to preserve humanity and compassion and strive for understanding despite the pain and circumstances that divide people. Not everyone is capable of this, so even though the parish was and remains open to all, many Russians have gone elsewhere, to places where the Ukrainian issue is not as central, to the Serbs or Romanians, for example.

Interestingly, though, they didn’t want to join another parish of the Moscow Patriarchate. I think they also feel the stigma of belonging to a Church that blesses a war of aggression. And even now, we still have people of different nationalities — there are Serbs, Bulgarians, Spaniards, and Norwegians."

“And who is currently performing services in the parish while you cannot?”

“At the moment, a priest from another patriarchate is serving, invited by the parish council. Interestingly, another parish of the Moscow Patriarchate once tried to go down a similar path, in the city of Stavanger. There, too, the parish council attempted to find a priest for services, but back then, there were very few priests, unlike now. So what Moscow was hoping for didn’t work out. They thought that by stripping a priest of his priesthood, they could control the parish and appoint a pro-Moscow priest. But it didn’t happen, and I hope it won’t. Though I’ll say again, those who support Putin will try to seize the parish, even though they haven’t been members or attended our church for years.”

“And if you officially transition to another jurisdiction, could the congregation follow and support you in that?”

“Of course. Those parishioners who left us are no longer with us. The rest, I hope, will follow me.”

"A few years ago, there were scandals related to the presence of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Norway—its parishes purchased buildings or plots of land near military facilities, including NATO bases. Among them was your community. Norwegian experts said this could pose a national security threat since Russia, which is waging a war of aggression, might use these properties for non-religious purposes. How did that situation end, or is it still unresolved?"

"Initially, a publication was released by the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, FFI). That was, let me recall... in 2021. It mentioned security threats from structures affiliated with Russia, specifically pointing to potential risks related to the purchase of our parish building. Later, in October 2022, there was an article in the large, though somewhat sensationalist, newspaper Dagbladet, where our parish was directly accused of posing potential security threats. By that time, the parish had become almost entirely Ukrainian, and we were doing a lot for both Ukrainian refugees and Ukraine's victory overall.

So, I filed a lawsuit against the newspaper in a special court and won the case. I was defending the parish and, in part, myself against the allegations made by the journalists. They claimed that it was the ROC that purchased the building and did so deliberately to spy on the military base. They also accused the entire community of collaborating with Moscow. Both claims were false. In my defense, I argued that the ROC did not purchase the church building—it was the parish that bought it without any assistance from Moscow. We raised the funds ourselves and received support from the Norwegian state.

Secondly, the article made a huge mistake—it referred to all the parishioners as Russians. This is absolutely not true. As I’ve already mentioned, most of the Russians left our parish because they disagreed with the pro-Ukrainian stance of the remaining parishioners and the priest. Formal affiliation with the ROC does not make someone Russian. But I emphasized that we are, for the most part, a Ukrainian parish with a pro-Ukrainian stance, which is reflected in the material support we provide to Ukraine and Ukrainians in Norway.

Moreover, it would have been personally advantageous for me to stay quiet and remain silent about the war in Ukraine, as most Orthodox parishes in Norway do. That way, I could have kept my position and status. But I knew what my stance on the war would cost me. This was also mentioned in court. After winning the case, the newspaper was forced to change the text of the article, retracting most of its accusations. Since then, there have been no further issues or insinuations on this matter."

It’s interesting that the situation could change dramatically if a pro-Russian priest comes to our parish. In that case, having a church near a NATO base could indeed become a problem. To some extent, it could pose a threat to national security.

At the same time, there’s another threat. With the new priest, new people will come to the parish council, and they’ll gain access to sensitive information, such as bank transfers made to the parish account by people of Russian origin who were supporting Ukraine. This could pose a significant risk, especially to those Russians or anyone connected to Russia, who trusted the parish and helped Ukraine despite their Russian roots or having relatives in Russia. The issue is that in Russia, even a 50-euro transfer to help Ukraine can result in imprisonment. Imagine, Mr. Taras, what could happen to those conscientious Russian citizens who participated in fundraising for Ukrainians and other efforts to support Ukraine, if this information became accessible to the FSB? This is precisely why, under current Norwegian law, it is prohibited to transfer sensitive information about citizens to countries outside the EU, especially to those where democracy does not exist."

“Yes, indeed, the situation could become threatening for the community in the first place. How can we counter such a worst-case scenario?”

“Society needs to stay aware. Norway takes the protection of private information very seriously. Therefore, this issue must be in the media. I believe this situation is not unique and may arise in other Western European countries as well. Perhaps we should involve politicians in this.

"Everywhere there are ROC communities, local manifestations of political, economic, and informational influence from Moscow are noted through these communities and among local parishioners, as well as beyond them. Scandals occasionally arise in various countries where ROC clergy have been accused of espionage."

"Yes, unfortunately, ordinary parishioners often resort to political ideas without contemplating their origins. They believe that the priest is speaking about religion, but in reality, he is offering a political narrative in a hidden form. It is even worse if the priest does this consciously.

I would point out another problem that, it seems to me, is often forgotten when discussing the influence of priests on their parishioners abroad. Many of them, especially those who arrived in Europe not long ago, maintain connections with their priests who remained in their home countries. They influence the thoughts and moods of their former parishioners. This leads to the situation where everything people see in Europe is viewed through the eyes of their 'elders,' who, in turn, lacking experience abroad, live through experiences akin to Soviet propaganda. I have encountered such situations many times. It is very difficult to deal with these people. They do not trust their eyes, their thoughts, or their own experiences. They view everything in a way that is destructive to their future. These individuals are predominantly under the influence of propaganda. They cling to the past, are unwilling to integrate into society and bring along the corresponding narratives.

Regarding the accusations of espionage, it is not coincidental; I believe that in Sweden, the state ceased support for ROC parishes amid espionage scandals. We can also recall the revocation of the residence permit for priest Mykola Lishchenyuk in the Czech Republic. This priest held a position there for about 20 years. Now he is the deputy head of the Department for External Church Relations in Moscow. Even his appeal to the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic did not help him — he was expelled from the country. Similar decisions may have been made in other countries; I am not following that. I only know that some leaders of the ROC have ended up on sanction lists in EU countries, including Patriarch Kirill.”

"Wherever ROC communities exist, signs of Moscow's political, economic, and informational influence are observed, both among local parishioners and beyond. From time to time, scandals arise in various countries where ROC clergy are accused of espionage or influencing local politicians through Orthodox channels. Have there been such incidents in Norway, or have there been attempts to persuade you to work in Russia's interests?"

"This is exactly what I’m talking about. Such indirect influence can exist, and it can come either from external sources or from local priests. A simple example is May 8th, or as it’s observed in Soviet tradition, May 9th. In Norway, Victory Day is celebrated on May 8th. The modern commemoration of Victory Day in Russia and Europe reflects different historical experiences and current values tied to reflecting on the past and looking toward the future. Russia’s celebration focuses on military triumph, heroism, and promoting patriotism, with an emphasis on the Soviet Union’s role in defeating Nazism. The European celebration, however, focuses on remembering the victims, reconciliation, and the need to maintain peace.

For Norway, it’s impossible to imagine events like the 'Immortal Regiment,' which Russia used in the lead-up to the war with Ukraine. Meanwhile, for example, the ROC parish in the city of Trondheim has participated in this event every year. As a necessary element — concerts featuring Soviet-era war songs were performed by the priest himself. These events are undoubtedly part of the 'Russian World' propaganda. Similar actions, along with the Russian embassy, are attended by other Moscow Patriarchate parishes in Norway, such as in Oslo, and in other European countries as well.

I used to attend commemorations at the burial sites of Soviet prisoners of war on May 9. But since 2014, I no longer do that. Instead, I always take part in the official Victory Day events organized by the municipality. I also hold a memorial service at the graves of Soviet POWs in my municipality, where, by the way, most of the names are Ukrainian. Without the songs. Meanwhile, the pro-Russian former parishioners mostly gather on May 9, as always, with songs and the red flag with Soviet symbols.

Once, I think it was back in 2008, I spoke with representatives of the Ukrainian diplomatic corps, telling them they should be more active in participating in Victory Day commemorations and send their representatives to the burial sites of Soviet POWs because it seems that Russia has stolen from us the right to be proud of the victory over Nazism. As if only Russia is the rightful heir of this great victory. But that’s simply not true.

I love and value this holiday. I have a personal connection to it here in Norway because my grandfather never returned from a POW camp in Norway. I found this out by chance in one of Norway’s archives: I discovered his registration card. So, Victory Day reminds me of my grandfather, whom I never knew. On this day, all of Norway speaks about peace. Not about 'We can do it again' (referring to Russia's militaristic slogan).

Have I been directly asked to work for Russia? No, not directly. But there was one time when I had a conversation with the Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Norway. This was at the beginning of 2008. I was asked to meet him privately at a hotel regarding a legal case in which I was involved, opposing the parish council that had initially hired me for service. It was an incident early in my career. As a young priest without much experience, I wanted to serve God and the people, but instead, I was essentially offered a 'Russian club,' where I would have had to conduct services three times every two months. This led to a major conflict. In hindsight, I would handle things differently, but back then, the lack of experience and understanding of human emotions led to serious consequences and significant reputational damage for the parish.

That’s why I was called in for a meeting with the ambassador. From the start, he acted very condescendingly, speaking to me as if I were a subordinate employee. However, I had good history teachers in seminary, so I told him that this is not how things are done, that it was like the Soviet times when the Church was under the strict supervision and control of the KGB. I want to emphasize that I was naive in thinking those times had passed. But that meeting proved useful because I was never invited to any further interviews. They likely suspected me of nonconformity and an unwillingness to cooperate, or even worse — of Ukrainian nationalism, although that was never brought up. Who knows?

As for other priests in Norway, I can say that, in one way or another, they have to cooperate with the Russian Embassy. For example, they are required to travel for services to Svalbard, regarding which there are ongoing disputes between Norway and Russia. One Ukrainian priest even changed his citizenship from Ukrainian to Russian to this end. Now, he no longer lives in Norway; he has moved to a southern country."

“Could it be Cyprus? There's a significant concentration of UOC-MP refugees there, particularly propagandists. They don't hide their unity or affiliation with the Moscow Patriarchate.”

“I don't know about that. As for Cyprus, it's a well-known offshore haven. Many Russians have settled there, including those against the war, the so-called "relocated persons." So it's not surprising that there's a Moscow Patriarchate presence there.”

“Has the presence of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Norway changed over the years? Are there any informational campaigns? Not necessarily about the war, but on other, "peaceful" topics? Is there any noticeable interest from the Moscow Patriarchate in having contacts with the Norwegian church environment?”

“Currently, the ROC has seven parishes in Norway. One in Kirkenes in the north, another in Trondheim, two in Oslo, two in Bergen, and one in Stavanger. There are also church groups where priests come to serve if they have the opportunity.

As for informational campaigns, each parish lives a life of its own, with its own tasks and problems. For example, our parish is currently raising funds for those affected by floods in Romania. We don’t only help Ukraine. Cooperation with other churches, not just Orthodox ones, is important for parishes abroad, as they often rent buildings for services. There are inter-church contacts, but less now than before.”

“Could an informational campaign be spreading the Russian viewpoint on what's happening in Ukraine, particularly about the war or church life? Are Norwegian ROC communities involved in this?”

“I don’t think it happens at the parish or diocesan level, at least not in Norway. Norwegian society is transparent enough for such experiments to be noticed, though individual priests may be involved. The personal sympathies of priests determine the general direction of parish life. For example, our parish is pro-Ukrainian because of the inclination of the former rector. People gather where they feel a sense of similarity. Others prefer a different agenda, so they join another community or priest.

I've always found propagandists like the late Archpriest Dmitry Smirnov or the Ukrainian refugee Andrey Tkachev repugnant. Their sweet-voiced sermons on the goodness of war are equally disgusting. The same goes for one of Moscow's leading war propagandists, Archpriest Artemy Vladimirov, or Patriarch Kirill. But there are people who like them, including clergy. For example, Vladimirov has visited Norway multiple times at the invitation of Father Alexander Volokhan, rector of the Trondheim church, who, by the way, was born in Lviv. I dare say that Father Artemy enjoyed visiting this beautiful country. Now he preaches about the decaying West and fascism, perhaps because he's no longer allowed to enter the West (as seen in his comments after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine).

So, in Norway, parishes don’t directly engage in propaganda. Everything depends on the personal preferences of the priests who lead the communities. The extent to which priests are involved determines the parish's stance.

“Have there been changes since the full-scale war in Ukraine? Have ROC representatives tried to influence Norwegian audiences with their views? And do they influence other Orthodox communities in the country?”

“We’re discussing the present, but this also applies to the past. Since the start of the full-scale war, only one priest, aside from me, has spoken in the media about the current situation. The rector of the St. Olga Parish in Oslo, Archimandrite Kliment (Huhtamäki), said that Patriarch Kirill's actions are destroying Orthodoxy in Europe. I fully agree with him, although he played a role in me losing my priesthood. It’s easier for him to speak to the media because he's Finnish and not tied to Moscow, except administratively. Plus, as a monk, he doesn't have to worry about supporting a family if he were to lose his position. His statements could be sharper, but he has chosen to distance himself from the Ukrainian issue, or politics altogether. For instance, he assigned another priest to hold a memorial service for Navalny. I think he is mindful of his parish. While it has many Ukrainian refugees, there is also a significant number of Russians.

As far as I know, Father Alexander from Trondheim hasn’t given any interviews to Norwegian media. He specializes in Russian channels like “Spas” and “Soyuz.” Norwegian priests of the Moscow Patriarchate (those of ethnic origin, I mean) also avoid speaking publicly on the subject of Ukraine and the war with Russia.

Historically, Orthodox churches in Norway haven’t been very influential in joint religious forums, so it’s hard to say if ROC parishes affect the broader religious environment.”

“To sum it up, what’s the sentiment in Norwegian society regarding these Orthodox communities, the ROC’s activities, and both Ukrainian refugees and Russians? Are there any changes in these attitudes?”

“This is the most difficult question, Mr. Taras. Norway is a democratic state, meaning it interacts with religious communities strictly according to the law. Since ROC parishes generally do not violate the law, they are treated like any other religious community. At least that’s the case until spies are uncovered, like in Sweden or the Czech Republic. This applies to state relations.

But as for the public attitudes, whether condemnation or support, they are quite different. Since the war began, people’s attitudes toward ROC parishes and the Church have changed as a whole. I would even say that attitudes toward Christianity have shifted. On one hand, parishes still collaborate with religious and secular institutions, and there is some interest in Orthodoxy from Norwegians. A Norwegian priest, the rector of another ROC parish in Bergen, mentioned this in a recently published article. But on the other hand, I see signs that interest is waning, and there is a kind of disappointment with Christianity. For example, people are selling off their icons in the secondary market. It’s becoming somewhat unpopular to have icons at home. This never happened before, not even in Soviet times. Now, more and more old icons are being sold every day. Norwegians are taking them to secondhand shops en masse. This is a secondary effect of the global crisis caused by the war in Ukraine, something similar happened after World War II.

Regarding the ROC, most comments in newspapers on articles related to the organization are negative, ranging from questions about why the state supports an organization that, in turn, supports war, to concerns about national security. Overall, Norwegians understand the essence of the conflict between the "Russian church" and Ukrainian statehood, so many commenters suggest establishing an independent Ukrainian church in Norway.

In general, the attitude toward Ukrainian refugees in Norway is positive, as long as they don’t break the law. There are no problems with this. In Norway, everyone is respected. It’s not customary to pry into someone’s private life, so relations with Russians are generally normal unless they give a reason for a different attitude. However, there are sometimes unfortunate incidents, such as when Ukrainians actively protest against Norwegian concerts featuring music by Rachmaninoff or Tchaikovsky. Norwegians find this hard to understand; from their perspective, it seems strange.

Those Russians who support Putin express their views only in closed forums or groups. Therefore, Norwegians are often unaware of the level of propaganda among Russians. However, I must say that there are honest Russian-born people in Norway who also unite to oppose putinism and the war. I am immensely grateful to these people because they take great risks in supporting our aid actions for Ukraine, both in Norway and abroad. Norwegians often participate in these joint actions as well."