Ukrainian prisoners in Budapest
The release of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war of Hungarian origin clearly demonstrated the existence of a wide network of church ties between the West and Russia. The sequence of events before the release of POWs cannot be accidental.
In Budapest, Pope Francis met not only with Prime Minister Orban but also with the former head of the Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church. This person, Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev, Patriarch Kirill’s “right-hand man,” is a pro-Vatican church politician who was removed from Moscow after the start of a full-scale war, allegedly because of his “pacifistic position’”.
As it turned out later, Metropolitan Hilarion's departure is difficult to call an "exile" - he is carrying out the delicate assignments of Patriarch Kirill in Europe, where the patriarch himself is now an unwanted guest. Metropolitan Hilarion, in his role as a defender of the interests of Moscow, is quite effective: Budapest has twice blocked attempts of the European Parliament to impose sanctions on the head of the Russian Orthodox Church. And Metropolitan Hilarion himself, in his video speeches, does not forget to emphasize the “fruitful” cooperation between church and state in Hungary.
After the meeting with the former “state secretary” of the ROC, Pope Francis, already in Rome, met with the current chief of the ROC diplomacy, Metropolitan Anthony, who arrived in Rome under some glib excuse.
A month later, Moscow handed over to Budapest Ukrainian POWs – inhabitants of the Transcarpathian region of Hungarian origin. The story is a bit mysterious. The extradition of the prisoners to a “third country” allegedly was organized “in secret” by the head of state, Prime Minister Viktor Orban – or so Hungarian official persons claim. It was carried out by the Deputy Prime Minister “on his own initiative” and thanks exclusively to his “personal contacts”. Such a ridiculous conspiracy can hardly mislead anyone. Both inside Hungary, where citizens applauded the ruling party, and outside, in the EU, where the European Commission demanded clarification from Budapest about uncoordinated policies and such specific “personal contacts” of the ruling cabinet.
In addition to the “special role” of the Deputy Prime Minister, there were all sorts of rumors about the most direct participation in the transfer of prisoners by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow personally.
In general, almost every participant in this story ended up like a winner. The Hungarian ruling party once again cheered up the national and imperial feelings of their supporters by acting as a “defender of the Magyars all over the world”.
Patriarch Kirill also benefited. He cleaned up a bit his reputation in the West: firstly, he demonstrated some goodwill and helped save people from captivity, and secondly, he played the role of a diplomatic “bridge” between the West and Moscow. Inside Russia, the patriarch also was able to demonstrate that he still has political weight and some influence abroad.
Pope Francis also received got his piece of the cake – he made some practical steps, “built the bridge” and helped Ukraine without sending ammunition. Interesting, that none of the participants of this strange story even mentioned the role of the Holy See in recent events. But the meetings of the Pope with the key actors in the key moment cannot be a mere coincidence. Everything else is hidden under a thick layer of secrecy that traditionally covers Vatican diplomacy.
To tell the truth, I note that the main benefits, of course, got Ukrainian prisoners of war. They are certainly better off in Budapest than in a Russian prison. Several of them even managed to return to Ukraine. The only embarrassing thing is that the Ukrainian side does not know the exact number of prisoners transferred or their current location.
Ukraine was excluded from the negotiation process. This is fully consistent with the Russian policy. Moscow disagrees with the subjectivity of Ukraine in the international relations arena. For current Russian leaders, it is preferable that Ukraine remain in the status of a Russian province. Let me remind you that within the USSR, the republics - in particular, Ukraine - allegedly were also “independent” entities, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic even had its own representation in the UN. As part of the current Kremlin policy, Ukraine should return to this - Soviet - position.
In the person of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Putin has found a sympathizer. Orban's Hungary shares at least some of Russia's contempt for Ukraine. And “Ukrainian Magyars” and their special rights are the subject of constant conflicts between Budapest and Kyiv. In this way, Orban maintains his voters' resentment of Hungary's former "greatness". This imperial resentment sometimes makes Viktor Orban and Vladimir situational allies in question, one way or another connected to Ukraine.
The Church has a special place in this story for two reasons. The first is ideological: in the religious world of the West, a new “conservative front” is being formed under the slogan of defending “traditional” rather than Christian values. At this point nationalist ideology and religious fundamentalism intersect. Russia seeks to play a leading role in this conservative alliance - as the main defender of "traditional values" that opposes the "destructive liberalism of the West." All the conventional forces of the world can join this alliance and expect Russian support.
The electorate of Viktor Orban has, in general, clearly conservative views. “Traditional values” are an integral part of his rhetoric and politics.
In this union there is quite naturally the place of the church, which not only “stands guard” for conservative values, but also “sanctifies” them, proclaiming them “divine truth” in the context of Christianity. Therefore, the participation of the Russian Orthodox Church on the one hand and the Holy See on the other is so important. This is precisely the “unity of all healthy forces in the world” about which Vladimir Putin likes to speculate, meaning that these “healthy forces” oppose such “diseases of the world” as the liberalism of the West.
The second reason why the church is included in the political game between Budapest and Moscow is its “non-political” status. The fact that the ROC and personally Patriarch Kirill are engaged in Kremlin politics is hardly a secret. But formally in Russia, the church is separated from the state, while in the West it is protected by a declaration on freedom of conscience and religion. On this basis, Budapest has twice blocked attempts of the European Union to impose personal sanctions against Patriarch Kirill. As a result, the extensive network of the Moscow Patriarchate – in particular, financial – can partly compensate for the loss of other channels – political, informational, and financial – that were cut off by sanctions imposed on Russian officials, politicians, and propagandists.
