Freedom of Conscience and National Security: Conflict or Cooperation. Notes from an Expert Discussion

According to Maksym Kolyba, Deputy Dean of Social Sciences and Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and the Faculty of Law of UCU, this was the first of three planned seminars to be held within the framework of the research project “Freedom of speech and freedom of religion within the legal regime of martial law and outside it in the context of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.” The project is implemented within Network Plus: Shifting Global Polarities, a platform for academic cooperation among universities in the United Kingdom, the EU, Ukraine, and other countries. The project involves comprehensive research, including a series of analytical seminars, as well as monitoring the media landscape and legislation in Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Estonia.

The first seminar consisted of two panel discussions.

The first panel, “Citizens’ Security as a Shared Responsibility of the State and the Churches: Legal, Political, and Religious Dimensions, Challenges, and Solutions,” focused on how to reconcile freedom of religion with national security during wartime and how to explain Ukraine’s position on this issue to the international community.

Moderator Maksym Kolyba reminded participants that the right to freedom of conscience and religion is protected by Articles 11, 24, 35, and 37 of the Constitution of Ukraine. Article 11, in particular, guarantees state support for the development of the “religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.” Article 24 guarantees equality of citizens before the law and in rights and freedoms and prohibits any privileges or restrictions based on religious or other beliefs. Article 37 prohibits the establishment and activity of political parties and public organizations whose programmatic goals or actions aim to incite religious hostility. Article 64 concerns the possibility of derogations from human rights and freedoms under martial law or a state of emergency.

Legislation in various states, as well as international treaties, establishes that freedom of religion and conscience is not an “absolute” right and may be limited during martial law or a state of emergency, or for the sake of public order and state security.

The moderator emphasized that Article 24 guarantees equality before the law and in rights and freedoms and prohibits any privileges or restrictions based on religious or other beliefs. Accordingly, the obligation to respect religious freedom extends not only to the state but also to citizens and organizations. “Even from the standpoint of one’s own freedom of views, we are encouraged to respect and defend it. However, ideological narratives of the enemy can pass through - and do pass through - religious organizations,” noted Kolyba.

Panel participants presented several perspectives on the topic from the viewpoints of the state, the Church, and society, in both historical and contemporary contexts.

The Ukrainian state does not ban any religion or Church; however, the use of religion as an instrument of aggression or the destruction of statehood is prohibited.

The Law of Ukraine “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations,” adopted in August 2024, clearly states that “given that the Russian Orthodox Church is an ideological continuation of the regime of the aggressor state, a participant in war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the name of the Russian Federation and the ideology of the ‘Russian world,’ (Russki mir)” its activities in Ukraine are prohibited (Article 3 of the Law).

The practice of instrumentalizing religion is not a new phenomenon. As early as Tsarist Russia, the Church was used to strengthen state influence both within the empire and beyond its borders. This tradition was preserved in the USSR and continues in Russia to this day.

Accordingly, Ukraine has a duty to protect itself from such use of religion. The aforementioned Law prohibits only those organizations affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church.

Ukrainians know very well the true price of freedom of religion, especially those who were banned in the USSR. This right was not granted; it was fought for.

For example, the history of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) over recent centuries is a story of existence within two different imperial models: the destructive Russian one and the reformist Austrian one. Under the Habsburg Monarchy, the UGCC had the opportunity to develop as an institution and became an important element of Galician civil society. By contrast, Russian authorities systematically destroyed Greek Catholicism, using religion as part of an assimilation policy: “You are Russians, therefore Orthodox.” This was a way of eliminating Ukrainian distinctiveness, an instrument of subjugation and control. This practice continued in the Soviet period, when the UGCC was liquidated and viewed as a “dangerous element” and “an agent of the Vatican.” From the perspective of a totalitarian system, this logic was understandable: the Church possessed moral authority and independence - qualities incompatible with the nature of Soviet power.

A different position was taken by the Moscow Patriarchate in the twentieth century. The restoration of the governing structures of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1943 was carried out under the full control of the NKVD (The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). From 1943 to 1964, virtually the entire episcopate of the ROC consisted of agents of communist security services. Initially, this was achieved through blackmail and violence, and later through targeted human resource policy, whereby seminaries trained future hierarchs loyal to the political system. These schemes functioned in one form or another until the collapse of the USSR.

A failure to understand this historical continuity often leads to misunderstandings abroad. In the West, there is hope that “healthy forces” exist within the ROC that are merely waiting for an opportunity to oppose the totalitarian system. Such expectations are detached from reality: today the ROC is no less a part of the Russian state machine than it was in Soviet times - and in some respects even more active.

It was acknowledged that historically, almost all states have intervened in religious processes in one way or another. The key difference, however, lies in the methods. Totalitarian regimes destroyed Churches by integrating them into the administrative apparatus or turning them into instruments of the security services, whereas democratic states act differently - through legal mechanisms, transparent evidence, respect for human rights, and a clear distinction between security and persecution.

Ukraine has not yet fully overcome the legacy of imperial and Soviet approaches to the religious sphere. State bodies responsible for religious policy must not turn into structures reminiscent of the past - neither Soviet committees for religious affairs nor services akin to the KGB. New conditions require a different logic: transparency, legality, clear procedures, and mutual respect. At the same time, Churches themselves must undertake internal work to overcome imperial myths, freeing themselves from inherited models of dependency that do not correspond to contemporary Ukrainian realities.

The constitutional principle of equality among citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs, implies responsibility not only on the part of the state but also on the part of every citizen and organization. Freedom of religion is not only a right but also an obligation not to turn religion into an instrument of manipulation.

Through religious structures, dangerous meanings and ideological “viruses” can sometimes penetrate society, undermining social unity. This is why it is important to reflect on the “religious dimensions of security.” Society functions as a living organism, in which, alongside the material component, a worldview and spiritual dimension also exist. A person is simultaneously a citizen and may be a Christian or adhere to another worldview, and these identities should not contradict one another. Religious and worldview values can and should strengthen civic positions, help assess challenges correctly, and foster resilience in the face of threats that are not only military but also spiritual and informational in nature today.

In a society under pressure from informational and semantic attacks, it is not enough to rely solely on defensive reactions. It is necessary to think not only about defense but also about creation - about shaping one’s own spiritual identity, developing Ukrainian religious communities, and establishing a clear and modern state policy in the field of religion.

Cooperation between the Church and the state must be equal and conscious, aimed at the common good rather than the instrumentalization of one institution by the other. In this context, Viacheslav Lypynsky was quoted as writing that religion is needed by society not only after victory, when the state has already been established, but also in the very process of struggle. Victory requires not only material strength but, above all, moral strength. This will not be provided by a Church that becomes a tool of politics or adapts itself to national weaknesses, but by one that is capable of teaching people to “fulfill the eternal and universal laws of creative civic morality.” Such an understanding of the Church's role - not as an instrument, but as a moral compass - is crucial at a time when religious freedom, national security, and the responsibility of every citizen intertwine into a single task: preserving and strengthening Ukraine.

In wartime, the state and the Churches are jointly responsible for citizens’ security, but this raises a complex question: what can the state demand from large religious organizations, and where does the boundary lie between legitimate requirements and freedom of religion?

For some believers, the connection with the Russian Orthodox Church is not a matter of politics, but rather a matter of religion, and severing it is simply impossible in their understanding. Some people today are fully and sincerely devoted to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. There are not many, but they are numerous enough that this reality must be taken into account.

The seminar also addressed practical issues of the functioning of religious organizations. In Ukraine, there is no open, up-to-date information on the number of parishes and parishioners in Churches, and consequently, no information on the financial realities.

There is no publicly available information about the documents and decisions adopted by the synods of the UOC, nor about changes in the composition of individual commissions and other Church bodies. A related problem concerns monitoring the implementation of sanctions against individual clergy of the UOC. Due to the lack of effective oversight, state decisions are not implemented as they should be.

Overall, these observations can be grouped as problems of the information space, above all, the absence of mechanisms to clarify the situation in the religious sphere. This sometimes leads to absurd situations in which even parishioners do not know which Church they belong to, and there is no clear understanding of the relationship between the UOC and the ROC.

The second panel, “Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech during War: Media Challenges and the Limits of Self-Censorship,” focused on problems in the media sphere, including manipulation, fakes, censorship, and self-censorship.

The discussion began with a review of a 2023 study by the “Deminitsiativy” sociology company, which found that self-censorship among media professionals increased between 2019 and 2023. Although the level of threats to journalists has officially decreased, self-censorship is still influenced by the fear of dismissal or harming one’s editorial office. Almost half of journalists indicate that there are topics that are “not timely” or that “the audience will not accept.”

Three religiously related issues of importance in the media space were discussed.

The first concerned the approach of Western media communities that insist on “hearing all sides and showing all voices,” which sometimes leads to absurd situations where overtly manipulative or fake narratives are included in coverage or distorted facts are taken into account.

The second issue was the historically formed image of the ROC in the West. Russian émigré structures, theological centers, and literary traditions have shaped a stable image of “deep spirituality” and a “defender of traditional values.” This creates communication problems for Ukraine, which is a priori portrayed as an enemy of those who espouse conservative views and as a proponent of a “liberal harmful agenda.”

The third issue concerned the irresponsibility of the Ukrainian media in covering religious news. Part of society is not ready to accept objective information when it comes to religion. People either want confirmation of their own prejudices or silence around uncomfortable topics. As soon as someone voices critical remarks - even purely technical or legal ones - it is immediately framed as “defending the Moscow Patriarchate” or “working against the state.” This logic of pressure makes meaningful discussion virtually impossible.

Editorial offices often take religious events out of context and present them through the prism of their own sympathies, creating distorted emphases. Overall, there is a noticeable lack of basic knowledge about the religious environment, interconfessional relations, and religious processes. The realities of internal church life, the influence of religion on political and social life, the state of interchurch relations, and the lack of dialogue remain largely overlooked.

Currently, the healthiest environment in this regard is military chaplaincy, where confessional or linguistic differences are virtually nonexistent. Outside of it, however, there is a noticeable “coolness” and reluctance to speak openly about problems.

Some of these problems are systemic, particularly concerning the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on various spheres of state, political, and social life. The question was raised as to how impartially and effectively officials in the judicial and law enforcement systems, the civil service, and local self-government can perform their duties in protecting the constitutional order if they identify themselves with the Moscow Patriarchate. An example was cited of a judge who recused herself from a case against a UOC MP bishop accused of spreading hostile propaganda because she herself was at that time a parishioner of that Church. This case was described as isolated but positive, since the judge objectively acknowledged her bias.

Participants also drew attention to the problem of religious topics being exploited in the media for “hype”: the use of speculation through emotional headlines, terminology, and distortion of facts. As a result, real events and context are overshadowed by emotion.

Experts have noted that civil servants, particularly those in diplomatic structures and institutions, are poorly oriented in religious matters. This leads to erroneous decisions, incomplete responses, and a lack of understanding of how to work with religious communities. In Ukraine’s still post-atheist society, it is easy to stigmatize, emotionally accuse, or “hype,” but difficult to argue in a reasoned manner and to listen to the other side.

At the same time, there is a problem of Western church, academic, and other communities misunderstanding Ukrainian realities, which results in naïve or unacceptable advice regarding responses to Russia’s aggression. This demonstrates the importance for Ukrainians themselves to communicate their positions accurately, taking into account the experiences, historical context, and backgrounds of other parties.

There are, of course, positive examples - above all, the activities of small groups of enthusiasts from religious communities who have effectively taken on the task of communicating Ukraine’s position to certain foreign religious and regional communities, often working with little or no state support. These initiatives are sometimes more effective than official diplomatic channels, but they require attention and reinforcement from the state to be successful.

Finally, a study on the availability of news about the war in different languages was discussed. According to the study, in countries where Portuguese, French, and Spanish are official languages, information about events in Ukraine was almost absent, even several months after the start of the full-scale invasion. This affected the political position of the Global South, which proved unprepared to support Ukraine - partly due to a lack of reliable and accessible information. This highlights the limitations of Ukraine’s informational capabilities and global influence.

Summarizing the second panel, participants highlighted the low level of media literacy in Ukraine, which renders audiences vulnerable to manipulation and facilitates the dissemination of unverified information. They also emphasized the need to more actively convey the truth about events in Ukraine at the global level, to draw attention to Ukraine’s multicultural and multireligious character, and to its high level of religious freedom. Additionally, they stressed the importance of conducting joint research projects with foreign partners and fostering cooperation among religious media initiatives.

In concluding the seminar, participants agreed that it is essential to address complex issues proactively and to work toward strengthening the Ukrainian voice in global discourse.